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Michael Risch *
INTRODUCTION
Modern designers of graphical user interfaces, or GUIs, have obtained
design patent protection for creative computer software displays, a realm
previously limited to copyright. The difference in protection is important.
Design patents do not require copying, while copyright does. Design patents
do not have a fair use defense, while copyright does. Design patents do not
exclude protection of ideas, while copyright does. Finally, design patents do
not apportion damages to the infringing component, while copyright does.
Thus, a trend toward patenting is unsurprising. However, design patents
for GUIs present some legal difficulties. Design patents should protect
ornamental designs only, but user interfaces incorporate significant
functional elements. 1 First, functionality might include the “idea” of the
invention; a design may be functional because it is so broadly construed that
it covers any design implementing the same idea. Second, functionality
might typically include the operation of the GUI; this is probably what most
people think of as functional. Third, functionality might include customer
expectations, ease of use, and ergonomics; this category is somewhat
scientific, despite the fact that many armchair observers have opinions
about what works in design and what doesn’t.
To be sure, GUIs include creative design elements as well, but there is
no clear dividing line between creativity and functionality in the current
case law. Indeed, few courts or commentators have specifically weighed in
on how design patents should apply to the mélange of functional and
*
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1
Reyes Juárez-Ramírez, et al., Towards Improving User Interfaces: A Proposal for
Integrating Functionality and Usability Since Early Phases, 2011 vol. 1 INT’L CONF. ON
UNCERTAINTY REASONING AND KNOWLEDGE ENGINEERING 119, 119-121 (2011)
(describing method of integrating usability design and program functionality of user
interface). As discussed in more detail below, determining what is ornamental is harder
than it sounds.
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ornamental features of GUIs. How should animations, such as a spinning
cursor or a simulated page turn be treated? What about the overall design of
the user screen? These questions, and more, have received little attention to
date. Those few non-GUI cases attempting to separate functionality from
ornamentality appear to rely on gut feelings more than analytical dissection.
In many cases, courts leave the determination up to the jury with little
guidance.
These issues came to a head in the recent case of Apple v. Samsung. In
that case, Apple sued Samsung for infringing –willfully, in fact—one of its
design patents. The jury found infringement by several Samsung phones,
and awarded hundreds of millions of dollars based on such infringement.
The following figure is a side-by-side comparison of Samsung’s screen with
Apple’s patent.

The screens are not identical, but that’s not the standard. Instead, the
standard is whether the ordinary observer would believe that the screen on
the left is the same as the patented design. The jury decided: “Yes” and the
District Court allowed the ruling to stand. In doing so, the Court explicitly
ruled that it need not (indeed should not) instruct the jury about which
functional aspects to include, disregard, or even consider. Though it was
told it could disregard elements if it wanted, the jury was left to decide as it
saw fit.
For design patent neophytes, this comparison and the jury’s verdict
usually leads to three questions that this article seeks to answer:
1. Isn’t this something that should just be copyrighted? Why should there
be a patent? The answer is relatively simple: the law has, since 1870,
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contemplated dual protection. I trace the history to explain why the law
could have evolved differently, but simply did not.
2. Both of these screens change, both before and after sale. How can
someone patent an ephemeral screen design? It also turns out that
ephemeral designs have been protected for some time. Even so, I
propose some limitations on the protection of GUIs that should address
the special nature of GUI design patents.
3. There are so many differences between these images. How can Apple
patent the idea of square icons in a grid with a dock bar at the bottom?
More intractable is determining when a design is infringing, and the role
that functionality should play in that consideration. The bulk of this
article is dedicated to answering this question.
Examination of economic principles may help guide courts in deciding
when a GUI is ornamental or not and how that fact should affect
infringement determinations. These same economic principles applied to
copyright disputes of the 1980’s and 1990’s, many of which were bitterly
fought but now seem relatively well-settled. Nascent GUI designers used
copyright law to protect the creative aspects of their designs. They did so
with varying levels of success; some cases extended protection while some
did not in seemingly opposed opinions. In prior work, 2 I identified the
principles underlying seemingly contradictory outcomes. Those principles
helped settle the field—even if no one knew it was happening. Indeed, GUI
copyright cases died off over time and are relatively rare today.
The economic analysis begins with two propositions.
First, courts are the gatekeepers to the proper level of copyright
protection. As such, they maximize social value, but based on the facts
before them, rather than attempting to maximize welfare ex ante with a veil
of ignorance as to facts on the ground.
Second, this intermediate, or delayed ex ante, optimization led to factors
that considered the relationship of the parties and the importance of the
particular software before the court, in addition to general encouragement
of innovation by the parties and other software designers. This maintains
dynamic efficiency, but uses more information as an input.
Thus, courts should be—and are—more likely to find infringement in
cases of market substitution, slavish copying, or breach of an economic
relationship.
2

I reconciled these decisions in a previous article. Michael Risch, How Can Whelan v.
Jaslow and Lotus v. Borland Both be Right? Re-Examining the Economics of Computer
Software Reuse, 17 JOHN MARSHALL J. COMP. & INFO. Law 511 (1999).
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Also, courts should be—and are—less likely to find infringement or less
likely to extend protections where customers benefit from compatibility.
For example, where switching costs are high, either due to hardware costs
or user training, courts will be more willing to allow reuse. Similarly, where
the design becomes a de facto standard, courts may be more likely to allow
others to use it.
Further, courts should be—and are—less likely to extend protection
where competitive principles favor compatibility. Courts will allow
software that provides network connectivity or an application programming
interface that allows software programs to exchange data.
These three factors—substitution, customer needs, and competitive
needs—explain virtually all, if not all, judicial copyright decisions relating
to software reuse, including GUIs. 3
This article considers whether the same economic analysis should apply
to the burgeoning law of design patents. I submit that it does. In fact, though
this article is limited to GUIs, the analysis could apply to any type of design
patent where success drives imitation in the idea of the design, rather than
the exact design itself.
First, courts should be the gatekeepers of the ornamental/functional
divide. They currently do so for bench trials, but have been hesitant to do so
for jury trials. Thus, the groundwork is laid for courts to act as a gatekeeper
in all cases. Judicial gatekeepers are an easier argument for copyright law
because copyrights are not examined. As a result, copyright litigation is the
first chance for an authoritative body to consider difficult questions.
Because patents are examined, however, the PTO could weigh in on
functionality, thus arguably alleviating the need for courts to do so. To be
sure, examination necessarily shifts much of the analysis earlier than the
infringement lawsuit, judges might still act as gatekeepers. Because the
importance of a GUI design can change over time, judges faced with
competing products will be in a better position than patent examiners to
assess future social welfare associated with protecting a GUI or allowing
reuse.
Second, courts hearing design patent cases should consider the same
economic factors that are critical to copyright—substitution, customers, and
competitors—when assessing design patent protection. They should do so
because the same factors will maximize social welfare. They should also do
so because these factors are consistent with the statutory requirements for
ornamental protection.
3

For example, the analysis on pp. 30 relating to competitive need to reuse closely
mirrors the facts and eventual outcome in the Oracle v. Google copyright trial. Michael
Risch, Oracle v. Google: Digging Deeper, MADISONIAN (May 9, 2012),
http://madisonian.net/2012/05/09/oracle-v-google-digging-deeper/.
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This article proceeds in three parts:
Part I briefly describes design patents, some important differences from
copyright, and high grant rates. Part II introduces key concepts associated
with GUI patents, namely functionality, ornamentality, and ephemerality.
This part introduces the core concern: determining whether a GUI infringes
a patent when it reuses some elements but does not copy the design exactly.
Part III summarizes the economic considerations for determining when to
allow reuse under copyright law. Part IV applies those considerations to
design patent protection. First, it concludes that the same considerations
should continue to apply to design patents, at least with respect to GUIs.
Second, this part examines how the economic factors might apply to design
patents.
I. DESIGN PATENT BASICS
Design patents protect non-useful aesthetic product designs: “Whoever
invents any new, original, and ornamental design for an article of
manufacture may obtain a patent therefor. . . .” 4 As discussed below, an
“article of manufacture” currently includes parts of articles of manufacture,
including the shape of just one side of a device, 5 ornamental attachments to
devices, 6 and images appearing on devices. 7 Protection lasts for 14 years
from the date the patent is granted. 8 In this sense, the protection for a patent
is much shorter than for copyrights, which last for ninety-five years for
corporate owned works. 9
With the shorter duration for design patents comes stronger protection. 10
First, unlike copyright, one need not copy to infringe. 11 Any use of the
design brings liability, and there is no independent development defense.
Second, there is no fair use defense; any infringement brings liability, no

4

35 U.S.C. § 171.
See, e.g., Patent No. D618,677 (filed Jan. 5, 2007) (claiming only front face of
iPhone)
6
See, e.g., Patent No. D618,244 (filed Oct. 19, 2009) (claiming “clip” that attaches to
electronic device).
7
See, e.g., Patent No. D675,639 (filed Sept. 19, 2011) (claiming portion of slide to
unlock icon but nothing else)
8
35 U.S.C. § 173.
9
17 U.S.C. § 302.
10
But see Sarah Burstein, Not (Necessarily) Narrower: Rethinking the Relative Scope
of Copyright Protection for Designs, 3 IP THEORY 114 (2013) (arguing that design patents
do not necessarily provide stronger protection than copyright).
11
Compare 17 U.S.C. § 501 (defining infringement as violation of a right, for
example, to make copies) with 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (outlawing the making, using, or selling
of an infringing product).
5
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matter the nature. 12 Third, design patents allow for much greater damages:
all of the defendant’s profits. 13 Copyright damages, on the other hand, allow
the defendant to show that its profits were not due to the infringement. 14
A designed (pun intended) safeguard on the power of these patents is
that they must survive the rigors of patent examination. Only those designs
that are novel and non-obvious may be granted.
But this safeguard provides no safety. It appears that examination fails
to rigorously separate the wheat from the chaff. An examination of design
patents granted shows a 90% grant rate, 15 with an average pendency of
merely 15 months (and only 13 months for the vast majority that were
granted on the first office action). 16 Pendency is slightly longer for GUI
designs, at just under 19 months, 17 but with pendency of less than one year
in expedited procedures. 18 In contrast, the average pendency of utility
patents during the same time period was more than 4 years for the most
common filing type. 19
To be sure, some of the pendency may be due to a better application to
examiner ratio for design patents. On the other hand, design patents tend to
cite a lot of prior art (20.6 mean, 13 median), and examiners added more
than half of that prior art from their own searches (11 mean, 9 median).20
Further, GUI design patents cited on average even more than the mean for
all patents (24.6 mean, 16 median), 21 and of those, examiners added nearly
two-thirds of all references! 22
12

35 U.S.C. §271(a).
35 U.S.C. § 289.
14
17 U.S.C. § 504(b).
15
Dennis Crouch, Design Patent Prosecution, DESIGN PATENTS IN THE MODERN
WORLD,
at
24-25
(Conference
Proceedings,
Apr.
5,
2013)
http://www.law.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/event/322028/media/slspublic/final_new_pp
tx_658586_1-full_size-op-1.pdf
16
Id. at 26.
17
Du Mont & Janis, Virtual Designs, supra note 41, at *29 (reporting pendency for
2012; the difference is statistically significant compared to other design patents).
18
Id.
19
Dennis Crouch, Update on Patent Pendency, PATENTLY-O (Apr. 30, 2010),
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2010/04/average-pendancy-of-utility-patents-issued-april27-2010claim-priority-to-foreign-applicationyesnoclaim-priority-to-us-no.html.
20
Reflects all issued patents since 2005. Data on file with author. The number of
references cited has increased with time. Du Mont & Janis, Virtual Designs, supra note 41,
at *34.
21
Du Mont & Janis, Virtual Designs, supra note 41, at *36. The comparison is more
striking given the timeframes. The averages I report are from 2005 to 2012, while Du Mont
& Janis report since 1996. Du Mont & Janis note substantial growth in citations since 1996,
which implies that an average dating to 1996 should be smaller than an average dating to
2005, not larger.
22
Du Mont & Janis, Virtual Designs, supra note 41, at *38.
13
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Despite finding all of this relevant art, 23 examiners almost never reject
based on prior art. First, patents are rarely rejected. Only 19% of GUI
Patents receive any rejection at all. The other 80+% issue unassailed. 24 For
GUI patents, 25 less than fifteen percent of all rejections were based on
novelty or obviousness. 26 And applicants may well have surmounted those,
since there were very, very few final rejections (60 out of about 556
rejections since 1996). 27 The numbers for animated designs are even more
startling: not one single rejection based on novelty or obviousness. Ever (at
least since animations were blessed in 2006). 28 Taking all the data
together, 29 as few as 2.5% of patents received a prior art rejection of any
kind. 30
It is clear that GUI patents are better examined than other design
patents, 31 and yet the “base” rejection rate is so low that even quadrupling it
for GUIs provides almost no actual examination based on the prior art,
despite the fact that examiners appear to have no problem finding more GUI
prior art than any other kind. As discussed further below, lax examination
(and the court-defined obviousness rules that allow it) is problematic, given
that no defenses allowing reuse currently exist.

23

By comparison, examiners add only 25% of the references for utility patents. Du
Mont & Janis, Virtual Designs, supra note 41, at *38 n 180. Despite this, novelty and
obviousness rejections are far more frequent. Id. at *43 (noting studies that show 86% of
utility patents receiving at least one rejection).
24
Du Mont & Janis, Virtual Designs, supra note 41, at *42.
25
Non-GUI design patents are virtually never rejected; only 3.37% of all rejections
since 1996 were for novelty or obviousness, and of those, not one single rejection in the
sample group cited novelty or obviousness. Du Mont & Janis, Virtual Designs, supra note
41, at *44.
26
Du Mont & Janis, Virtual Designs, supra note 41, at *44.
27
Id.
28
Id. at *45.
29
This calculation is necessarily an approximation, since there were more rejections
than there were patents, meaning that some patents may have been responsible for multiple
rejections. Further, file wrappers were not available for some patents, which I assume
means no rejections.
30
Du Mont and Janis report a more conservative number of 7.5%, based only on those
patents with a file wrapper, whereas I consider all patents. Du Mont & Janis, Virtual
Designs, supra note 41, at *46. Crouch, supra note 15, at 25, reports 1.2% rejection rate for
all design patents. It is, of course, possible that other patent applications were rejected or
abandoned based on prior art. However, the grant rate is 90%, so even if every single
ungranted patent were rejected for prior art, the total percentage would still be very small.
31
Du Mont & Janis, Virtual Designs, supra note 41, at *46 (“What we can say is that
there is no support for the position that design patents on virtual designs are of dubious
quality compared to other classes of design patents.”).
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FUNCTIONALITY, ORNAMENTALITY, AND EPHEMERALITY

Design patents protecting GUIs evoke important threshold questions
relating to the protection of functional elements, or whether GUI elements
are properly protected by design patents at all.
The first design patent statute, enacted in 1842, envisioned protection
for novel drawings and images incorporated into articles of manufacture. 32
The protection was extremely important for design protection at the time,
because drawings, paintings, and photographs were not protected under the
Copyright Act until 1870. 33
Meanwhile, the language of the design patent statute caused great
distress. Because it protected “useful” designs, inventors obtained design
patents on new shapes for well-known useful inventions. As the
Commissioner of Patents stated in Ex Parte Crane, 34 the first decision to
interpret this part of the statute:
The line of distinction between what is useful and what is merely
ornamental is, in some cases, very indefinite. By some it is said that
any form or design that is most useful, is also most pleasing. It
would be impossible, in the view of such persons, to make any
improvement in utility that did not at the same time add to the
ornamental and artistic.
I can perceive no necessity for the distinction. There is a large
class of improvements in manufactured articles that are not regarded
as new inventions, or as coming within the scope of general patent
laws. They add to the market value and salability of such articles,
and often result from the exercise of much labor, genius, and
expense. They promote the best interests of the country, as well as
the creations of inventive talent. It seems to me to have been the
intent of Congress to extend to all such cases a limited protection
and encouragement. Whenever there shall be produced by the
exercise of industry, genius, effort and expense, any new and
32

Patent Act of August 29th, 1842, 5 Stat at Large543, § 3 (protecting any “new and
useful pattern, or print, or picture, to be either worked into or worked on, or printed or
painted or cast or otherwise fixed on, any article of manufacture….”
33
Act of July 8, 1870, §§85-111, 41st Cong., 2d Sess., 16 Stat. 198, 212-16; cf.
Copyright, 3 Am. L. Rev. 453, 454-55 (“It was also contended that [the infringed stage
play scenes], were not of a literary, but of a mechanical order, and not subject to the
protection of the Statute of Copyright; and that the scene . . . must be protected by . . .
design patents for the scenery and properties.”); Donald M. Millinger, Copyright and the
Fine Artist, 48 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 354 (1980).
34
Ex Parte Crane (Dec. Comm’r Patents Apr. 20, 1869) (patent granted on new
arrangement of product that had already been denied a utility patent as non-novel: “).
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original design, form, configuration or arrangement of a
manufactured article, it comes within the provisions and objects of
the act creating design patents, whatever be its nature, and whether
made for ornament merely, or intended to promote convenience and
utility. 35
This ruling led to the rise of so-called “patent sharks” that would extract
payments from unsuspecting farmers using farm equipment that looked
similar to new designs. 36
In 1902, the Commissioner of Patents requested that Congress eliminate
the word “useful” from the statute, noting that design patents were never
intended to protect functional equipment. 37 Instead, the word “ornamental”
was introduced into the statute, where it has remained until today.
Early courts struggled with the amendment, but quickly settled on a rule
that also still applies: if a design is primarily ornamental, then the fact that it
has some functional elements will not disqualify it from protection. 38
35

Id. See also Ex parte Bartholemew (Dec. Comm’r Patents Dec. 7, 1869) (“In thus
denying that a new ‘shape or configuration’ of an article, whereby utility or convenience is
promoted, is the proper subject of a patent, under the acts referred to, the office would
seem to have involved itself in the absurdity that if a design is useless it may be patented,
whereas if it be useful it is entitled to no protection. Fortunately . . . office is relieved from
so grievous an imputation. . . . Articles have been, and are being constantly, patented as
designs which possess no element of the artistic or ornamental, but are valuable solely
because, by a new shape or configuration, they possess more utility than the prior forms of
like articles.”).
36
Gerard N. Magliocca, Blackberries and Barnyards: Patent Trolls and The Perils of
Innovation, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1809, 1820-21 (2007); see also Annual Report of the
Commissioner of Patents for 1872 (Jan. 23, 1872) (“Very many design patents, which
cannot, under the law, be denied, are a fraud upon the public. A man applies for a patent on
a cultivator, or hammer, or any other useful tool or device, and finding himself fully
anticipated in every principle and useful feature of his invention, abandons his application
and at once applies for a design patent for the same thing. This application he bases upon
some peculiarity of form or color, having nothing whatever to do with the merits or
demerits of the article itself; and not being anticipated in these respects, a patent is granted
for the new design. The patent gives him no protection whatever, except as to the form or
color upon which it is based.”).
37
U.S. Senate, Committee on Patents, Amending Section 4929, Revised Statutes (S.
Rep. No. 1139). Apr. 15, 1902.
38
Mygatt v. Zalinski, 138 F. 88, 89 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1905) (“That it is useful as well as
ornamental does not affect its patentability as a design patent.”); compare Ashley v.
Weeks-Numan Co., 220 F. 899, 901 (2d Cir. 1915) (“[W]e declare that the subject-matter
of a patent is not rendered unfit as a design patent by the mere fact that it is possible
somewhere in its construction to discover a mechanical function.”) with Best Lock Corp. v.
Ilco Unican Corp., 94 F.3d 1563, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“However, if the design claimed
in a design patent is dictated solely by the function of the article of manufacture, the patent
is invalid because the design is not ornamental.”)
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Another change in the 1902 amendment was the elimination of
incorporation of pictures and drawings from the statute. 39 The legislative
history implies that the removal was of superfluous material, 40 and since
that time, designs patents with drawings have continued to issue.
The 1902 amendment (and practice since that time) leads to the first two
questions discussed above.
A. Should Design Patents Protect Purely Copyrightable Material?
First, given that copyright law expanded to protect the previously
unprotected pictorial and graphic works, perhaps design patents should not
be used to protect such works separately from articles of manufacture. In
other words, copyright might perform a channeling function to protect nonproduct-based images. One favoring channeling might argue that design
patent laws could not have been intended to protect copyrightable images
from all uses without the benefit of fair use, independent creation,
idea/process, or other defenses.
The 1902 amendment has not received enough attention, at least not on
this question. The 1842 inclusion of protection for pictures and drawings in
design patents was instituted long before copyright protection protected
such works. After copyright began protecting such works, Congress should
have reconsidered design patent protection more explicitly, but it did not 41
and it has not. 42
At the time, the Commissioner of Patents foresaw a channeling
function. In requesting the 1902 amendment, the Commissioner of Patents
noted:
It is thought that if the present bill shall become a law the subject of
39

Revised Stat. 4929, PL 57-109, 32 Stat. 193 (May 9, 1902).
S. Rep. 1139, supra note 37; see also, Harold Binney, Present Status of the Law
Relating to Designs, 25 Annu. Rep. A.B.A. 662, 664 (1902) (arguing that changed
language did not eliminate design patent protection for drawings and printed materials).
41
Binney, supra note 40, at 662 (describing how new statute was passed within a one
month period, with no input from any patent practitioners or other members of the public);
In re Schnell, 46 F.2d 203, 205 (CCPA 1931) (holding that amendment did not change
protection for application of pictoral works to manufactures), citing Ex Parte Fulda, 1913
C.D. 206.
42
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954) (failing to mention 1902 amendment: “We
do hold that the [design] patentability of the statuettes, fitted as lamps or unfitted, does not
bar copyright as works of art.”). Indeed, copyright thinking still struggles with drawings
and photographs today, even without consideration of design patents. Rebecca Tushnet,
The Images of Copyright, 125 HARV. L. REV. 683 (2012); Christine Haight Farley, The
Lingering Effects of Copyright’s Response to the Invention of Photography, 65 U. PITT. L.
REV. 385 (2004).
40
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design patents will occupy its proper philosophical position in the
field of intellectual production, having upon the one side of it the
statute providing protection to mechanical constructions possessing
utility of mechanical function, and upon the other side the copyright
law, whereby objects of art are protected, reserving to itself the
position of protecting objects of new and artistic 43 quality
pertaining, however, to commerce, but not justifying their existence
upon functional utility. If the design patent does not occupy this
position there is no other well-defined position for it to take. 44
This quote could be interpreted in two ways. On the one hand, it implies
that there should be some channeling between artistic and commercial
images. On the other hand, it implies that copyrighted works can be
patented, so long as they are “artistic” (now ornamental) and part of a
commercial design.
In practice, both readings have applied. There are artistic works that do
not qualify for patent protection, having been successfully channeled.
Indeed, the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office’s (USPTO’s) examination
guidelines for computer icons 45 makes clear that the difference between
patentable and unpatentable images is a clear drawing and claim placing the
image on a display screen or other object. Images not tied to display screens
are not considered articles of manufacture. 46 But the channeling is
incomplete; one may surmount the “display” hurdle without any trouble
whatsoever. 47 For artistic works, a simple dotted line denoting attachment to
some article of manufacture ends the inquiry.
Thus, the notion that GUIs are copyrightable is unlikely to affect design
patentability, even if it could have in 1902 or should today.
B. Are Ephemeral Interfaces Really Articles of Manufacture?
Today, design patents cover images, and only images, displayed on a
screen. 48 As many claims are written, merely viewing an image on a blog
43

The commissioner’s proposed “artistic” requirement was changed to “ornamental”
in the final statute.
44
S. Rep. 1139, supra note 37.
45
MPEP 1404.01(a).
46
Id.
47
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954) (allowing copyright or design patent
protection of a functional lamp). See, e.g., Mark P. McKenna & Katherine J. Strandburg,
Progress and Competition in Design, __ STAN. TECH. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2013)
(arguing that design patents might be justified by integration of design and function, but
cannot be justified to protect surface ornamentation).
48
Apple Patents an Encircled Musical Note, PATENTLY-O (Oct. 25, 2012) (“The
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page or in a PDF file associated with this article (which includes some
patented images) would constitute infringement. From a theoretical point of
view, something seems off about that: viewing an image on a display screen
can hardly be considered an article of manufacture, yet the law outlaws
precisely such use, even if one is simply viewing the patent itself on a
computer! 49
Thus, the second threshold question is whether an ephemeral image,
viewable anywhere and in any context, can be considered an “article of
manufacture” under the statute. The guidelines, issued in 1996, give
surprisingly little attention to this question. Courts have long held that
“surface ornamentation” constitutes an article of manufacture, 50 and
displayed images are part of a surface. Thus, the guidelines only ask
whether the image is part of a display, not whether an ephemeral image is
they type of thing that should ever be protected.
Even if one accepts that copyrightable works should be protected by
design patent, this does not mean that all copyrightable expression qualifies
for patent protection. Consider, for example, protection of structure,
sequence, and organization of factual information. This may well be
protected by copyright, 51 but does not fall under the design patent umbrella.
question: Is Patently-O infringing the design patent by showing the image on your
screen?”), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2012/10/apple-patents-an-encircled-musicalnote.html.
49
35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (“[W]hoever … uses … any patented Invention … infringes the
patent.”). Indeed, simply copying the patent on paper might be an article of manufacture; it
is unclear whether the display screen is a binding limitation. Further, patents need not limit
themselves, since designers could place the image any article of manufacture—like a
coffee mug or t-shirt.
50
Mygatt v. Zalinski, 138 F. 88 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1905) (reflector surface design); Phoenix
Knitting Works v. Hygienic Fleeced Underwear Co., 194 F. 703, 706 (C.C.D. Pa. 1911)
(“The alleged new design therefore may safely be said to reside in the surface
ornamentation” of a neck scarf), aff’d on other grounds, 194 F. 696, 699 (3d Cir. 1912)
(“The design must be ornamental when the scarf is on the neck of the wearer, and not be
such as to only fulfill its purpose as an ornamental design when it is lying flat upon a
table.”); Macbeth-Evans Glass Co. v. Rosenbaum Co., 199 F. 154, 167 (D. Pa. 1912) (“The
evidence shows that both the infringing [lamp] shade and the Evans shade were exhibited
for sale while lighted, and it is while lighted that the proposed purchaser will observe
them.”). See also, Jason J. Du Mont & Mark D. Janis, The Origins of the American Design
Patent System, 88 IND. L.J. __ (forthcoming 2013) (discussing surface ornamentation at
foundation of design patent system); Jason J. Du Mont & Mark D. Janis, Virtual Designs,
__ STAN. TECH. L. REV. __, at *4-*6 (forthcoming 2013) (discussing surface ornamentation
rules). Indeed, the design patent that led to the rule that infringers must pay all of their
profits as damages involved the surface design of a rug. Mark Lemley, A Rational System
of Design Patent Remedies, __ STAN. TECH. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2013),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2226508.
51
Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 710 (2d Cir. 1991) (“Kregos can obtain a
copyright by displaying the requisite creativity in his selection of statistics. But if someone
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This may seem like a silly comparison, but a comparison of the interface
patents to infringing devices below will show that courts could allow
protection of design structure rather than particular images in the future.
Furthermore, protection of user interfaces essentially merges the
copyright law’s fixation requirement with patent law’s article of commerce
requirement. Fixation is the cornerstone of copyright: no work can be
protected if it is not fixed in a tangible medium. 52 But fixation is far from
permanent; loading a file into computer memory is sufficiently fixed, even
if the computer could be turned off or the memory changed. 53
The question, then, is whether any image present in computer
memory—fixed, to be sure—becomes an “article of manufacture,” even if it
is not displayed on the screen at all times. Thus far, the PTO has said yes,
and courts have not asked the question, assuming that if a patent issued,
then it must be an article of manufacture. Indeed, design patents now
protect “animations,” which are a series of images that move in sequence,
such as a spinning icon or a simulated folding of a page to emulate a book
on a display screen. 54
Protection of displays appears to rest on two seminal cases issued by
that Court of Customs & Patent Appeals, the precursor to the Federal
Circuit. Both are cited by the PTO guidelines. 55 The first case is In re
Hruby, 56 which held that the shape of water moving in a fountain could be a
patented design, even though the water was moving and could be turned off.
The court reasoned that the ornamental result (the water) was not fleeting,
but was instead a predictable and permanent aspect of the fountain’s
design. 57
The second precedent is In re Zahn, 58 in which the CCPA ruled that a
else displays the requisite creativity by making a selection that differs in more than a trivial
degree, Kregos cannot complain.”); CDN Inc. v. Kapes, 197 F.3d 1256, 1260 (9th Cir. Cal.
1999) (“The prices listed are not mere listings of actual prices paid; rather, they are CDN's
best estimate of the fair value of that coin. To arrive at this estimate, CDN employs the
process described above that satisfies the ‘minimal degree of creativity’ demanded by the
Constitution for copyright protection.”).
52
17 U.S.C. §§ 102(a), 101.
53
MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993) (loading
software into RAM creates “fixed” copy).
54
David Leason, Design Patent Protection for Animated Computer-Generated Icons
91 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 580, 585-87 (2009); MPEP § 1504.01(a)(IV); In re
Koehring, 37 F.2d 421, 423-24 (C.C.P.A. 1930) (holding that moving parts does not
change patentability).
55
MPEP § 1504.01(a)(I).
56
373 F.2d 997 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
57
Id. at 999 (“We . . . would add that the permanence of any design is a function of the
materials in which it is embodied and the effects of the environment thereon.”).
58
617 F.2d 261 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
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portion of a manufacture could be separated by a “broken line” to separate
the new, protectable design from the preexisting remainder of the article. 59
Though the notion that a portion of an article could be patented is more than
140 years old, 60 the Zahn court’s broken line rule leads to the near ubiquity
of broken lines in graphical displays that separate the image from the rest of
the display. 61
Despite the apparent reasonableness of Hruby and Zahn with respect to
the facts of those cases, their extension to user interfaces is troubling.
Courts and commentators have simply not asked the difficult questions.
Collapsing fixation, animation, and display screen into an “article of
manufacture” leaves design patents on a very slippery slope.
For example, there is no theoretical bar to protecting every displayed
copyrightable work with a design patent. Every television show and movie
is theoretically a novel and non-obvious design to be incorporated into
display screens everywhere. Indeed, every photograph captured and
displayed on every mobile device might be protected. Every doodle on an
electronic Etch-a-Sketch could be patented. Any use of the material would
be infringing, without any consideration of fair use, the ideas represented by
the work, or even the first amendment.
Further, and perhaps more unsettling, the only apparent reason why
such claims have not been made before is that nobody thought to do so,
because there is no body of law to avoid such an outcome. 62 The PTO has
almost no tools to reject small, or even large, 63 snippets of movies. While
only a single inventive design may be covered by a patent, multiple patents
might be filed on different—but important—segments of audiovisual works,
sufficient to block all downstream use with no fair use defense. A design
patent protecting four or five screencaps from the famous Hitler Downfall
movie scene would eliminate all claims to fair use of that short but
endlessly entertaining parody clip. 64 The PTO has no track record of
59

Id. at 269 (“While the design must be embodied in some articles, the statute is not
limited to designs for complete articles, or ‘discrete’ articles, and certainly not to articles
separately sold. . . . No sound authority has been cited for any limitation on how a design is
to be embodied in an article of manufacture.”). Zahn involved a shank on a drill bit, and
only the “ornamental” design of the shank was protected.
60
Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511, 521 (1871) (affirming patent on
spoon and fork handles, but not the spoon/fork portion.
61
Leason, supra note 54.
62
And, to be fair, perhaps the cost of obtaining a patent.
63
Patentees submit an average of 7 figures per patent, though one patent issued since
2005 submitted as many as 216 figures. Data on file with author.
64
Hitler Downfall Parodies: 25 Worth Watching, THE TELEGRAPH (Oct. 6, 2009),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/news/6262709/Hitler-Downfall-parodies-25-worthwatching.html. Two of my personal favorites are Hitler learns his teaching schedule,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mLC7Q3DTzi4, and Hilter is Furious at the Supreme
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rigorously examining images to determine whether they are novel or
obvious. Even if it did, the exact combination of images in that screen are
unlikely to appear elsewhere.
This parade of horribles might be solved in two ways. First, courts could
recognize that an article of manufacture (or portion thereof) requires more
than copyright fixation. Instead, an article of manufacture requires
permanence at the point of manufacture, display, and use. To be sure, many
elements might be hidden at one point or another, such as bottoms of
drawers, collapsible devices, folding elements that become hidden, or even
water fountains. But each of these examples is different in kind from the
ephemeral images on a display screen. Ephemeral images can be configured
by moving bits in memory, and as such, they are not ornamental articles of
manufacture; instead, they are displays of information. In short, the PTO’s
1996 concern about patenting of images was well-founded, but the solution
was not to add “on a display screen” to patent claims. Instead, the solution
was to recognize that images divorced from manufacture do not qualify as
articles – they can be shown on any article, any screen, and any device, and
that is not what design patents are meant to protect. 65
A second solution might recognize that modern commercial products
live under a big tent. As such, there may be times when the design of the
product includes designs on the screen. However, protection for displayed
surface designs should be limited in a number of ways to ensure that the
design is an ornamental article of manufacture, rather than an ephemeral
image.
1. Limitation: Original Manufacture and Distribution
First, such designs should be limited to the original manufacture and
distribution of devices that include the image. This would exclude
protection for images introduced on devices after manufacture and sale. It
would also exclude infringement by the display of images unassociated with
the original product, such as broadcast images or photographs.
Design patent owners would surely object to this limitation; they would
argue that it would allow competitors to “copy” their designs by
downloading images to existing devices at some later date. And they would
be right – some newly developed icon, screen organization or other design
Court for Granting Cert to Bilski, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NMszkJC6v9M.
65
But see, Du Mont & Janis, Virtual Designs, supra note 41, at *10-12 (discussing
drawing of Peter Rabbit for use on many types of products and design patents for type fonts
that can be patented without consideration of a display screen); Adobe Sys. Inc. v.
Southern Software Inc., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d 1827, 1832-33 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (holding that type
fonts are design and software that displays this is article of manufacture).
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could be used by others who do not produce them as an article of
manufacture. 66 In other words, if the broken line is critical to show that the
design is part of a display then distribution of the image separated from that
display cannot be an article of manufacture, even under existing law. Just as
Hruby’s water-fountain shape is protected because some underlying
mechanics reliably created it, his design would not be protected if one could
replicate the water movement through some other form of water
manipulation that did not involve a manufacture. 67
Limiting protection (and infringement) to original manufacture and
distribution would not destroy the incentives of the design patent statute. In
fact, such limitations have been suggested before as part of a proposal to
encourage innovation. 68 Companies would still have an incentive to design
novel displays, because competitors could not use those displays in their
product designs. This would provide a competitive advantage at the point of
sale. Presumably, rules could be developed that stop competitors from
avoiding the rule by selling empty devices that are updated soon after sale.
2. Limitation: Rigorous Obviousness Rules
Second, if displayed images are protected as articles of manufacture,
then the PTO must rigorously examine such applications and actually reject
some on novelty and obviousness bases. This is easier said than done for
legal and practical reasons. Legally, the obviousness rules for design patents
are incredibly permissive; virtually nothing is obvious. 69 Thus, examiner
hands are tied to some extent.
The rigid rules for finding obviousness must be read to be believed. The
66

Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511, 528 (1871) (requiring design patent
infringement to be determined at the point of sale: “[I]f, in the eye of an ordinary observer,
giving such attention as a purchaser usually gives, two designs are substantially the same, if
the resemblance is such as to deceive such an observer, inducing him to purchase one
supposing it to be the other, the first one patented is infringed by the other.”); but see,
Contessa Food Prods., Inc. v. Conagra, Inc., 282 F.3d 1370, 1379-80 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(requiring infringement analysis at any time during normal use lifetime of the product, not
just the time of sale).
67
See, e.g., M. Night Shyamalan, The Last Airbender (2010) (character shapes water
using telekinesis). Indeed, the Hruby Court made clear that the patentee was in the
“fountain selling” business – it wasn’t selling “water,” but instead the underlying pumps
and hoses. In re Hruby, 373 F.2d 997, 1000 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
68
Frank W. Dahn, Designs – Patents or Copyrights, 10 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 297, 298
(1928) (describing proposed legislation to limit design protection to sale of designed
article).
69
Crouch, supra note 15, at 25. But see Titan Tire Corp. v. Case New Holland, Inc.,
566 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (affirming denial of preliminary injunction based on
probably finding of obviousness).
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rules require a prior design that is nearly identical to the patented design
before the analysis can even begin. The court in Apple v. Samsung70
describes it clearly:
To determine whether ‘one of ordinary skill would have combined
teachings of the prior art to create the same overall visual
appearance as the claimed design,’ the finder of fact must employ a
two-step process.” [] “First, ‘one must find a single reference, a
something in existence, the design characteristics of which are
basically the same as the claimed design.’” [] “Second, ‘other
references may be used to modify [the primary reference] to create a
design that has the same overall visual appearance as the claimed
design.’” [] “However, the ‘secondary references may only be used
to modify the primary reference if they are so related to the primary
reference that the appearance of certain ornamental features in one
would suggest the application of those features to the other.’” 71
This two-step test is limiting in two ways: a) it stacks the deck in favor
of validity by requiring that one piece of prior art is basically the same as
the patented design, and b) it only allows combination upon specific
suggestion. 72 Hupp v. Siroflex 73 is illustrative. In Hupp, the patentee
claimed a stamp used to make concrete look like stone. Other such stamps
existed, but not in the design claimed by the inventor. At trial, the jury
found that the primary reference was a series of ceramic tiles that looked
like Hupp’s design—at least the design of the concrete once it was stamped.
Hupp argued that even if one saw ceramic tiles of the same pattern, it would
not render a stamp to make that pattern obvious. The court agreed, ruling
that: “We have been directed to no teaching or suggestion to a person of
ordinary skill to look to a floor tile construction and convert it into the
design of a mold to make a concrete simulated stone outdoor walkway.” 74
In Hupp, even an identical design was not enough, because the rules
assumed that no designer would convert a tile design to a stone stamp
design, even knowing that other stamp designs were available on the
70

Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Motion for Judgment as a Matter of
Law, Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elec. Co. Ltd., Case No. Case No.: 11-CV-01846-LHK
(Document 2220, Jan. 29, 2013).
71
Id. at 6 (citations omitted), quoting in part Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co.,
Ltd., 678 F.3d 1314, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
72
Du Mont & Janis, Virtual Designs, supra note 41, at *57 (arguing that current test is
easily misapplied with respect to GUI patents).
73
See, e.g., Hupp v. Siroflex of Am., Inc., 122 F.3d 1456, 1462-63 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(reversing a finding of obviousness of a stamp to create simulated.
74
Id. at 1463.
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market. Surely a stamp designer would think to make a new design in a
stamp upon seeing a pleasing tile design; utility patent rules would find
such a combination obvious.
Thus, although design patents are examined under the same obviousness
statute as utility patents, 75 the rules do not seem to apply the same
obviousness standards as utility patents.
Indeed, the current design patent rule has its genesis in the Federal
Circuit’s former “teaching-suggestion-motivation” test. 76 The teachingsuggestion-motivation test required some explicit suggestion in the prior art
that references be combined. This, of course, is nearly impossible with
designs, which are almost always depicted graphically, and thus cannot
suggest or teach anything in the way that an academic article or patent
might. This might account for the Federal Circuit’s two-step rule: requiring
prior that is nearly identical is the only way to assure that there is a
suggestion in a prior art.
In addition to permissively allowing patents, both the two-step and the
teaching-suggestion-motivation tests are rigidly applied, and outlaw the use
of not only common creativity but also common sense. Such a rigid
approach was unambiguously and unanimously rejected by the Supreme
Court in KSR v. Teleflex. 77 In KSR, the Court ruled that obviousness
determinations should be flexible. The court noted that inventors are not
automatons, and possess ordinary creativity. 78 Further, references might be
combined for many reasons, including market factors and limited choices
available to solve a known problem. 79
After KSR, the bright-line, strait-jacket test of design patent obviousness
must be rejected. 80 Current rules are neither supported by statute nor
Supreme Court precedent. Indeed, design patents should be (and used to be)
judged like any other patent. 81 Surprisingly, the rigid rule is still used. 82
75

35 U.S.C. § 103.
In Apple v. Samsung, the lineage of the two-step rule is traced to Durling v.
Spectrum Furniture Co., Inc., 101 F.3d 100, 103 (Fed.Cir.1996). The rule is much older,
though. In re Rosen, 673 F.2d 388, 391 (CCPA 1982); L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn
Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 1124 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“[Defendant] offered twenty-two
references that were asserted to show or suggest various features of the ‘081 design, and
argues that the ‘081 design is readily reconstructed from elements found in the prior art. . .
.The district court concluded that there was no teaching or suggestion in the prior art of the
appearance of the claimed design as a visual whole. We discern no error. . . .”)
77
KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007)
78
550 U.S. at 421.
79
550 U.S. at 424.
80
550 U.S. at 421 (“Rigid preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common
sense, however, are neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with it.”).
81
Blisscraft of Hollywood v. United Plastics Co., 294 F.2d 694, 695 (2d Cir. 1961)
(“What plaintiff did amounted to nothing more than an unstartling regrouping of old
76
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Practically, it may be difficult for patent examiners to find displays to
use as prior art. Such displays are not part of any database. This concern
only goes so far, however. As discussed above, design patents cite on
average more than twenty prior art references, which are both prior design
patents and products disclosed by inventors. Despite these references, there
are almost never rejections based on references the examiner thought
relevant enough to cite. Not requiring inventors to explain—even once—
why their designs rise above the prior art diminishes the entire process.
3. Limitation: Infringement and Filtration
Better rules that eliminate obvious patents before they issue would be
preferable to leaving all decision-making until litigation. Even so, if
disputes do arise, more critical consideration of infringement standards can
alleviate many GUI design patent concerns. The conventional wisdom
among lawyers I have met is that design patent protection is extremely
narrow, requiring nearly identical features. 83 They are surprised when they
elements which demonstrated no originality born of inventive faculty. This is not
enough.”); but see Jason J. Du Mont, A Non-Obvious Design: Reexamining the Origins of
the Design Patent Standard, 45 GONZAGA L. REV. 531, 599-604 (2010) (arguing that
design patents were never intended to be judged by an obviousness standard, and that
permissive obviousness rules are a product of standard that had become too harsh). Perhaps
courts have overcorrected, because the standard is virtually non-existent now.
82
Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 678 F.3d 1314, 1329-30 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(applying rigid rule without citing to KSR but citing pre-KSR obviousness rules: “To
determine whether ‘one of ordinary skill would have combined teachings of the prior art to
create the same overall visual appearance as the claimed design,’ the finder of fact must
employ a two-step process. First, ‘one must find a single reference, 'a something in
existence, the design characteristics of which are basically the same as the claimed design.'
Second, ‘other references may be used to modify [the primary reference] to create a design
that has the same overall visual appearance as the claimed design.’ However, the
‘secondary references may only be used to modify the primary reference if they are 'so
related to the primary reference that the appearance of certain ornamental features in one
would suggest the application of those features to the other.’”) (citations omitted) ; but see,
Titan Tire Corp. v. Case New Holland, Inc., 566 F.3d 1372, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(affirming under old rules, but leaving open possibility that KSR might apply: “it is not
obvious that the Supreme Court necessarily intended to exclude design patents from the
reach of KSR.”). Apple v. Samsung cited Titan Tire but made no mention of avoiding rigid
rules.
83
See, e.g., Du Mont & Janis, Virtual Designs, supra note 41, at *60 (“We anticipate
that design patents on virtual designs are likely to be used primarily as tools to combat
counterfeiting. We are referring to cases in which the accused design is identical to the
patented design. . . .”); Bruce A. Kugler & Craig W. Mueller, A Fresh Perspective on
Design Patents, 38 COLO. LAW. 71, 72 (2009) (describing point of novelty test as allowing
easy infringement avoidance). This is not a new understanding. Consider, for example,
Arthur W. Cowles, Mechanical and Design Patents, 3 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 484, 488 (1921)
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learn that merely similar designs might infringe, and even more surprised to
learn that those similarities might be the abstracted ideas of the design
rather than similarities in the actual images. Even if the Apple v. Samsung
case may be the first of its kind, it represents a potential precedent for
design patent GUI litigation.
Beginning with the next subsection, the remainder of this Article is
dedicated to this topic, which is also the third question from the
introduction.
C. Infringement and Filtration
The design patent rule for infringement is similar to that in copyright
law: similarity. With design patents, infringement determinations are made
by comparing the accused device with the design patent, to see whether the
ordinary observer familiar with all of the designs in that field would believe
that the accused product is the same as the claimed design. 84 Stated this
way, the rule is even easier to satisfy than copyright infringement; one need
only be confused about which design is being used.
The infringement rule does not allow for focus on just those elements
that are new, the so-called “point of novelty” of the design. 85 Furthermore,
the designs need not be exact; they need only be similar enough that the
ordinary observer would find similarity. 86
One potential divergence from copyright law is the absence of filtration
in the infringement analysis. A primary mechanism used to allow reuse in
copyright law is filtration. 87 Before any copyrighted GUI is compared to an
accused GUI, unprotected elements like ideas are filtered out. Only the
(“A mechanical patent is superior to a design patent for the external configuration of the
mechanical instrument, because theoretically the properties of the mechanical instrument
may be embodied in more than one external configuration, therefore, in more than one
design.”).
84
Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511, 528 (1871) (“[I]f, in the eye of an
ordinary observer, giving such attention as a purchaser usually gives, two designs are
substantially the same, if the resemblance is such as to deceive such an observer, inducing
him to purchase one supposing it to be the other, the first one patented is infringed by the
other.”); Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 670 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en
banc).
85
Egyptian Goddess, 543 F.3d at 672-73.
86
Id.
87
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (introducting
abstraction and filtration); Computer Assocs. Int'l v. Altai, 982 F.2d 693, 706 (2d Cir.
1992) (“As discussed herein, we think that HN14 district courts would be well-advised to
undertake a three-step procedure, based on the abstractions test utilized by the district
court, in order to determine whether the non-literal elements of two or more computer
programs are substantially similar.”)
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swiss-cheese creative expression that survives filtration may be asserted
against others.
In theory, the design patent rule might still allow for filtration. For
example, elements associated with the prior art might be filtered somewhat.
After all, the ordinary observer is expected to know the prior art, and to not
find infringement where the similarities are based on preexisting designs. 88
Indeed, some courts have also filtered out functionality elements when
testing for design patent infringement. 89 Such filtration would expressly
protect ornamental elements, but not functional ones.
In reality, however, filtration is much more difficult to achieve under
current practices. Because all prior art is submitted to the jury, any filtration
is invisible to the courtroom and thus nearly invulnerable to appeal. 90
Furthermore, while judges are willing to filter out functional elements in
bench trials, they are less willing to do so for jury trials, again leaving such
determinations unreviewable. 91
As discussed below, judges should retake this gatekeeping role and filter
in every case.
III. THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
The economic analysis 92 begins with the revelation that it is too costly –
perhaps impossible – to devise a consistent rule regulating reuse of
computer software elements that can be consistently applied ex ante. 93 This
revelation is reflected in the contrary judicial opinions and scholarly
proposals of the time. The discussion here attempts to use this information
to explain judicial behavior.
A. Genesis of Reuse
The late 1980’s and early 1990’s were a time of great uncertainty in
88

Egyptian Goddess, 543, F.3d at 672.
Richardson v. Stanley Works, Inc., 597 F. 3d 1288, 1293-94 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (court
filtered out functional elements in bench trial).
90
Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13240, *13 (N.D. Cal.
Jan. 29, 2013) (adopting deferential standard to jury verdict and assuming jury weighed all
prior art.)
91
Id. at *16 (“The cases do not suggest that this type of claim construction is
appropriate when instructing a jury.”)
92
This section includes some of the key relevant analysis from the prior paper. A
complete presentation of the model and its defense is offered there.
93
Risch, supra note 2; see, e.g., William F. Patry, Copyright and Computer Programs:
It’s All in the Definition, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 4 (1996) (arguing that courts
have “overreacted” and propounded inconsistent definitions of “originality” and “computer
program” thus making consistent and efficient decision making difficult).
89

22

Functionality of GUI Design Patents

[14-Aug-13

copyright law with respect to the reuse of computer software elements.
Three leading cases ruled in apparently contradictory ways.
In Whelan v. Jaslow, 94 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a
copyright infringement verdict. In Whelan, the defendant had worked on a
dental office program with the plaintiff and had entered into a joint sales
agreement. 95 He then created a competing program that bore some
similarity to the plaintiff’s program—at least in functionality for dental
offices. 96 The court held that the look and feel was sufficient to constitute
infringement, even though the similarities were based in part on the needs
of a dental office. 97 Whelan is now nearly universally derided as
overprotecting software. 98
In Lotus v. Borland, 99 the First Circuit seemed to go the opposite
direction, ruling that a menu user interface could never be protected because
such menus are “modes of operation” unprotected by the Copyright Act.100
The court likened the menus to buttons on the VCR (or now, a DVD
player). 101 The Supreme Court granted certiorari, and the opinion was
affirmed by an evenly divided vote due to a recusal. 102 About 15 amici
briefs were filed in the case, with only one of them favoring Lotus.
Finally, cases like Computer Associates v. Altai 103 presented a
reasonable legal rule, but provided too little guidance to aid lower courts in
making decisions. The Computer Associates court mandated use of the
abstraction-filtration-comparison test. Using this test, the court determines
the various levels of abstraction in the program—from the very specific
expression to the most general ideas presented—and removes
uncopyrightable elements. For example, ideas are not protected nor are
scenes a faire, the common elements one would expect to see associated

94

Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986).
797 F.2d, at 1226.
96
Id. at 1227 (“Dentcom [Jaslow] sold both the Dentalab and Dentcom programs, and
advertised the Dentcom program as ‘a new version of the Dentalab computer system.’).
97
Id. at 1248 (“We hold that (1) copyright protection of computer programs may
extend beyond the programs' literal code to their structure, sequence, and organization, and
(2) the district court's finding of substantial similarity between the Dentalab and Dentcom
programs was not clearly erroneous.”).
98
See, e.g, Plains Cotton Coop. Ass'n v. Goodpasture Computer Serv., Inc., 807 F.2d
1256, 1262 (5th Cir.1987) (expressly rejecting portions of Whelan v. Jaslow).
99
Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir.1995)
100
17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
101
49 F.3d at 817.
102
Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, 516 U.S. 233 (1996)
103
Computer Assocs. Int'l v. Altai, 982 F.2d 693, 706 (2d Cir. 1992); see also Gates
Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., 9 F.3d 823, 834 (10th Cir. 1993); Apple Computer v.
Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1445-46 (9th Cir.1994).
95
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with a particular type of computer program. 104
While the rule is helpful in theory, it provides too little guidance in
practice. It does not help courts decide what to abstract or what to filter.
Consider, for example, the competing desktop motifs in Apple v.
Microsoft. 105 The court ruled that the use of a desktop motif in general was
an unprotectable idea, but that a particular creative way of organizing a
computer screen to look like a desktop was expressive creativity. 106 It is not
clear why a desktop should have been considered an idea, though, because
desktop organization of computers was not standard at the time Apple
implemented it, and it had little relation to computer operation at that time.
In fact, the court did rule that HP could not use Apple’s particular
depiction of the trash can, 107 which may be why Microsoft uses the recycle
bin today. But the trash can could have been a separate level of abstraction;
once one accepts a desktop motif, it is not unreasonable to include a trash
can. And once inclusion of a trash can is considered an unprotected idea,
one would expect that trash cans will look similar. 108
These examples show how difficult it is for courts to define and apply
ex ante rules. The cases appear to either overprotect or underprotect
copyrighted expression. Where the cases apply a standard, the standard
provides weak guidance.
B. Descriptive and Normative Application
Given the apparent inability to prescribe consistent rules or easily
applied standards, courts are left to apply the law as well as they can. The
question is how they do so. The analysis presented here, seeks to explain
104

Incredible Techs., Inc. v. Virtual Techs., Inc., 400 F.3d 1007, 1015 (7th Cir. 2005)
(“[G]olf is not a game subject to totally "fanciful presentation." In presenting a realistic
video golf game, one would, by definition, need golf courses, clubs, a selection menu, a
golfer, a wind meter, etc. Sand traps and water hazards are a fact of life for golfers, real and
virtual.”).
105
35 F.3d at 1443.
106
Id. (“Apple cannot get patent-like protection for the idea of a graphical user
interface, or the idea of a desktop metaphor which concededly came from Xerox. It can,
and did, put those ideas together creatively with animation, overlapping windows, and
well-designed icons; but it licensed the visual displays which resulted.”).
107
Apple Computer v. Microsoft Corp., 821 F. Supp. 616, 622 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (“Like
the garbage icons in the Macintosh and Lisa, the ‘Waste Basket’ icon in [HP’s] NewWave
Developer's Release is depicted as an outdoor alley-style cylindrical garbage can with a lid
and a handle on the top. Although the [HP] garbage can … does not have vertical lines to
indicate a fluted surface or a handle, a trier of fact could reasonably find substantial
similarity between it and the garbage icons in Apple's works.”).
108
Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1971)
(holding that similarities in jewelry shaped like bees were due to bee similarities, and not
infringing).
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how the courts have (and continue to) resolve difficult computer software
reuse questions.
As such, the analysis is primarily descriptive – it identifies the factors
that courts apply, even if those factors are not technically part of the rules or
standards. Instead, once these factors are present, courts will apply the rules
and standards available to achieve the right outcome.
Despite the admittedly backward looking nature, I believe that the
factors identified here are predictive of how courts will behave in the future.
I also believe that they are normatively justified, and should be applied even
if I am wrong as a descriptive matter.
The obvious objection here is that it is easy to explain an economic
theory in hindsight to fit the facts of the cases, and that does not mean it is
normatively justified. This analysis, like others, is open to that criticism.
But this analysis is different in one key respect. Rather than starting by
explaining the past, it considers the future. In other words, as discussed
below, courts are concerned with the past and the future. The analysis is
based on normative suppositions. While one may argue that such
suppositions are wrong, one cannot argue that they are based solely on a
descriptive aggregation of the cases. Instead, the cases fit the social welfare
we would expect to see given different decisions. For this reason, the
analysis shows that Whelan, a case that is universally reviled as wrong, was
normatively justified based on the theory.
Thus, the analysis is descriptive of past activities, but is also supported
by sufficient welfare maximization theory and sufficient predictive power to
serve as a normative basis for the future.
C. Intermediate (or Delayed Ex Ante) Optimization and Dynamic
Efficiency
The analysis diverges from some traditional assumptions, however. It
assumes that courts maximize social welfare based on the facts before them,
in a sort of delayed ex ante analysis. Thus courts will consider the
relationship of the parties, the importance of the software, the number of
users affected, and other such information to ensure society is better off.
This may not appear unusual, but it is. Traditional analysis implies that
courts attempt to set rules to maximize social benefit from an ex ante
perspective, without regard to the specific dispute at hand. Under a pure ex
ante model, courts should subject themselves to a veil of ignorance,
choosing the law that will lead to the best outcomes before either has
written any software code at all. Some call this dynamic efficiency:
consideration of efficiency at many points in time, rather than ex post.
The analysis here is not quite ex post, though, and attempts to maintain
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dynamic efficiency considerations. An ex post analysis would begin the
analysis at the time of the lawsuit, at a time when all information was
revealed and no information could change future behavior. Instead, here the
intermediate time period is measured just before the reuser makes the
decision to reuse. In other words, the court considers what came before the
reuse, but still sets rules that might affect the behavior of the reuser given
how the world has treated the original work. Thus, the analysis is
interchangeably considered intermediate or delayed ex ante. 109
The difference between the ex ante and intermediate approach is
exemplified by Gracen v. Bradford Exchange, 110 in which the court denied
copyright protection to a plate depicting scenes from the Wizard of Oz.
Judge Posner ruled that because administrative costs are high in
determining whether a second plate copied from the original plate or from
the movie, the original plate should be denied protection. 111 Using
intermediate analysis, however, a court would recognize that in this case,
the defendant knew that Gracen made the plate, and deliberately copied the
original plate without paying her; 112 there were no administrative costs at all
at the time Bradford Exchange decided to reuse the work. Social welfare –
of a different kind – would be maximized, based on the facts before the
court before the decision to reuse.
Posner’s outcome was arguably efficient ex ante because the author
would in general get paid for her work and would have an incentive to
create, even if copyright did not inhere. Further, a small incentive is all that
would be necessary because of the small degree of creativity required. In
addition, the administrative cost of determining the original elements for
copyright protection in derivative works based on live people, photographs,
or motion pictures would be high in most cases.
Under intermediate analysis, however, the judge would note that in this
case the author did not get paid for her work, and therefore it would
improve the welfare to require payment for the reuse; otherwise, people
might stop creating new designs that might simply be copied without
reward. Also, the administrative costs described above did not even exist in
the case at bar, as copying was virtually admitted. Finding infringement
would have been dynamically efficient because it would have created future
incentives to not breach economic relationships with little offsetting
administrative or other social costs.
Gracen is an extreme example of ex ante analysis making a rule that is
109

My prior article used the term “ex post” as a term of art, but I opt for the more
accurate terminology here.
110
698 F2d 300 (7th Cir 1983).
111
Id. at 304-05.
112
Id. at 301-02.
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ostensibly efficient for all cases in the future, on average, without regard to
the current case. 113 Delayed ex ante consideration will often lead to
conclusions similar to the pure ex ante analysis, but a focus on the facts at
the time of reuse may also allow a focus on “unexpected” behavior that
might occur after the first work is created.
In short, the analysis focuses on facts that are unknown before creation
of the first work, but are important and known at the time reuse occurs. As
discussed further below, what happens after the first product is released is
critical to the analysis.
A key question is why the generalizations do not simply lead to new ex
ante rules that affect incentives to create. To some extent, they do. Knowing
each of the factors will guide initial decisions about both how much to
create and how much to reuse. The reuse allowed by the analysis will
certainly affect the costs and benefits of protection at the time the first
work is created, and will continue to affect decisions for the creation of
followon works.
The factors cannot solely consider ex ante facts, though, because we
also value reuse. And we cannot know the nature of any reuse until the
reuser actually makes the decision to reuse, sometimes long after the first
program is created. The decision of what to reuse and how will be based on
technical and market considerations that do not develop until long after the
first program is sold. Thus, exploring all of the costs and benefits associated
with the factors remains impossible until the time just prior to reuse.
Because there are two actors, the courts’ decisions must consider both ex
ante incentives to create and ex post incentives to reuse in order to
maximize social benefits. After all, every software creator is also a partial
reuser of what came before. Despite incorporating additional factual
information, dynamic efficiency considerations are maintained.
D. The Factors
Though judicial decision-making can be modeled in a cost and benefit
formula, 114 courts don’t explicitly apply calculations. Indeed, the rules that
courts can apply are limited, and may not explicitly consider the social
welfare calculus. But the combination of rules available give courts tools to
reach appropriate outcomes, even if they are not doing so explicitly.
113

Indeed, the Seventh Circuit has all but repudiated Gracen since Computer Software
Reuse was published. Schrock v. Learning Curve Int'l, Inc., 586 F.3d 513, 516 (7th Cir.
2009) (“[Gracen] should not be understood to require a heightened standard of originality
for copyright in a derivative work.”).
114
Computer Software Reuse presents the full model, including a more complex
mathematical description in the footnotes. Risch, supra note 2, at 524 n. 62.
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Furthermore, while each case is different, trends do emerge. The goal of
this section is to identify and discuss several economic factors that might
affect judicial analysis. These factors make some assumptions about costs
and benefits associated with each factor. Of course, courts faced with actual
disputes might change their analyses where the factors do not cleanly apply.
Courts should and do consider at least four factors when deciding
whether software should be reused. First, they consider market substitution.
Second, they consider customer need for compatibility. Third, they consider
competitive need for compatibility. Fourth, they consider the breach of an
economic relationship.
In each of these factors societal benefits are either increased or
decreased, and the costs and benefits to the parties are roughly equal
because there is a wealth transfer. This is a good thing. Because each case
affects societal benefits, it is that much more important to be able to
distinguish cases (or fact patterns within a case) where societal benefits
increase and where societal benefits decrease. The factor based analysis
becomes even more important when multiple factors appear in the same
case, as factors might offset each other.
1. Market Substitution
Where the reuse is intended to substituted directly for the original in the
marketplace, courts will be less likely to allow the reuse; the closer to 1:1
the substitution is, the more likely reuse will be barred.
Here, the first producer will be worse off due to profits taken by the
reuser. On the other hand, the reuser will be better off having taken some of
the market. Indeed, the reuser may gain even more than the original
producer loses depending on how much value the new product adds in the
market.
In other words, at worst, there is a direct wealth transfer from the
producer to the reuser. There is some benefit to the reuser that exceeds the
loss to the producer. This is because the reuser adds value, which enhances
benefits. Further, as the reuser adds more value, the loss to the producer is
less due to reuse and more to competition. In short, the more new value
added by the reuser, the more increased private benefits there will be (and
the more likely reuse will be allowed). 115
115

See, e.g., Sony Comp. Ent. Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 607 (9th Cir.
2000) (“The district court found that ‘[t]o the extent that such a substitution [of Connectix's
Virtual Game Station for Sony PlayStation console] occurs, Sony will lose console sales
and profits.’ [] We recognize that this may be so. But because the Virtual Game Station is
transformative, and does not merely supplant the PlayStation console, the Virtual Game
Station is a legitimate competitor in the market for platforms on which Sony and Sonylicensed games can be played.”).
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Societal benefits are ambiguous depending on the amount of
substitution. Dynamic efficiency implies that some benefits will decrease
due to decreased incentive to create caused by decreased profits if reuse is
generally allowed. However, an offsetting societal gain may be due to
increased competition and the innovation that follows new creation. The
more the substitution, the more incentives decrease and the smaller the
benefit from competition.
On the whole, to the extent that societal and producer benefits
decrease more than benefits increase for the reuser, the court will disallow
reuse. For this reason, courts are far more likely to bar slavish copying, and
more likely to allow reuse that adds new value or does not constitute a
direct substitution.
2. Customer Need for Compatibility
Courts allow reuse if many customers would benefit from the reuse or
be harmed by its disallowance. This factor is driven by intermediate
analysis, because customer needs cannot be known at the time the original
work is created. 116 In short, market success leads to customer reliance, and
limited reuse of key elements may improve social welfare. Thus, the
functionality associated with this factor will relate primarily to ergonomics
and operations.
Considering customer needs does not sacrifice dynamic efficiency. As
long as slavish copying of an entire program is disallowed, this factor still
ensures that companies recoup their investment in the first software
program. They will, of course, make investment decisions that consider the
probability that some program elements will lose protection due to customer
needs. Thus, the investment in each program may decrease, but the ability
for new program authors to compete and add new features by reusing
certain elements offsets this decrease. A court should only reduce the
protection if customer/societal interests would actually be served by
reducing protection.
One area where this factor will arise is with de facto standards. A
product becomes a “de facto” standard when virtually everyone uses it
regardles of approval by some governing body. 117 Such standards are
116

Kenneth W. Dam, Some Economic Considerations in the Intellectual Property
Protection of Software, 24 J. Legal Stud. 321, 351 (1995).
117
Janice M. Mueller, Patent Misuse Through Capture of Industry Standards, 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 623, 633 (2002) (“De facto standards are not promulgated by a
particular body, but arise spontaneously due to marketplace success.”); David A. Balto,
Standard Setting in a Network Economy (Feb. 17, 2000) (“Although standard setting case
law is almost exclusively devoted to the activities of standard setting associations,
competition principles apply equally to situations in which a dominant firm sets a de facto
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peculiar because market leads are transient. By the time a dispute is
adjudicated, the market lead may be gone while the standard remains. 118
The question is whether there exists a trademark-like “policing” duty
that the first creator must perform to keep a program element from
becoming an industry standard, or whether a program element is so
important that courts will allow reuse whether or not the element has been
“policed.” 119
The “customer compatibility needs” factor allows courts to assess–at
any time during the first product’s life cycle–when an element should cease
to be protected and when it may be used by other programmers. At this
point in time, the creator would no longer be able to rely on the product’s
“momentum” and others would be able to use certain elements. 120 It may
be, like many generic trademarks, that early on in a product’s life, the
element is protected but later on the element may be reused.
As with substitution, producers will lose some benefits due to market
substitution for the new product. Assuming no slavish copying, though,
private gains to the reuser should be positive and outweigh the producer’s
loss due to the reuser’s ability to break into a market that would otherwise
be captured by the producer’s product.
With respect to social welfare, there may be some reduction due to a
lack of incentive to create. The decrease attributable directly to the law
should not be large, however, because the loss to producers caused solely
by the reuse (rather than competition) is arguably relatively small if the
original software is so popular that customers would benefit from reuse. 121
Because this factor includes switching costs, we would expect social
costs to decrease (and welfare to rise) due to lower switching costs. Another
aspect of social welfare might increase due to greater competition and
incentive to innovate by reusers, in addition to more customers who are

standard and abuses its subsequent market power through exclusionary acts such as
monopoly leveraging,” ), http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/other/standardsetting.shtm.
118
Patry, supra, note 93, at 8 n37 (noting that by the time of the Lotus v. Borland
decision relating to reuse of menu structure, Lotus was no longer the substantial market
leader it had once been.).
119
Of course, a further question is whether design patents change the calculus, as
discussed below.
120
Timothy S. Teter, Note, Merger and Machines: An Analysis of the ProCompatibility Trend in Computer Software Copyright Cases, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1061, 1072
(1993); Joseph Farrell, Standardization and Intellectual Property, 30 JURIMET. J. 35, 36
(1989).
121
Lawrence D. Graham and Richard O. Zerbe, Jr., Economically Efficient Treatment
of Computer Software: Reverse Engineering, Protection and Disclosure, 22 RUTGERS
COMP. & TECH. L.J. 61, 125 (1996) (noting broad approval of reverse engineering when
monopoly profits are large).
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better able to choose programs that meet their needs. 122 In addition, the
potential for new competition might drive the initial provider to develop
new software rather than simply rely on its prior work.
Additionally, social costs might be affected by the standards aspects of
any program. The costs may be high or low, depending on the quality of the
pre-existing program. If the program is of high quality, then the increase in
social costs will be low by allowing reuse; allowing more people to use high
quality software features is a social good. Indeed, barring reuse may
actually create social costs. 123 However, if the program quality is low, then
the increase in social costs could be high; allowing reuse will not create
incentives to create improved technology, and more customers will use
inferior technology. 124 While there is disagreement on this issue, 125 partial
reuse for customer compatibility indicates that the increase in social costs
would be small, because new software manufacturers will be allowed only
to reuse the elements necessary to keep customer costs low, but reusers
would otherwise add functionality in order to obtain future customers.
In the aggregate, the gain in social benefit and the decrease in social cost
should outweigh the sometimes administratively costly determination of
whether customer needs for compatibility justify limited protection for
certain elements. 126 On the whole, social benefits are increased greatly,
switching costs are reduced (to varying degrees), other social costs may
increase slightly, and benefits gained by the reuser outweigh a loss in
benefits to the producer. Thus, in most cases where there is a customer need
for compatibility, courts will allow reuse.
3. Competitive Need for Compatibility
The fourth factor assesses the competitive need for compatibility. This
factor relates more to operation functionality reuse of ideas than to
ergonomics. The factor is directly driven by the need for software programs
to communicate with other programs, to work on a particular hardware
122

Id.
Nicolas P. Terry, GUI Wars: The Windows Litigation and the Continuing Decline of
Look and Feel, 47 ARK. L. REV. 93, 132 (1994).
124
Joseph Farrell, Standardization and Intellectual Property, 30 JURIMET. J. 35, 46
(1989) (excessive dissemination means that an inferior standard may capture the market).
125
Compare Farell, Id., with Peter S. Menell, An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright
Protection for Application Programs, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1045, 1068 (1989) (broad
copyright protection may lead companies to adopt incompatible and non-efficient standards
to avoid reuse) and Matthew P. Larvick, Note, Questioning the Necessity of Copyright
Protection for Software Interfaces, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 187, 211-12 (1994) (limited or no
protection for user interfaces will not “freeze” current interfaces into static standards).
126
Teter, supra note 120, at 1072.
123
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platform, or to provide features expected of a particular type of device.
The factor is similar to the trade dress notion of functionality: to the
extent that software looks similar because of functional requirements, the
reuser will not be held liable for copyright infringement. 127 However, for
copyright, this factor usually relates to unseen portions of programs. Its
potential application to design patents will follow in a later section.
Some argue that competitive compatibility is simply a pretext for
cheaply taking profits rightly earned by the first author’s original
creation. 128 The pretext argument fails economic analysis, however. 129
Companies that must copy in order to compete under this factor will usually
attempt to license the technology because it is less expensive and more
expedient than reverse engineering and protracted legal battles. 130 Because
one company owns the technology another is trying to license, however,
hold-up costs arise, which make voluntary and efficient transactions more
difficult to achieve. The courts must resolve such market failures.
As with the other factors, the reuser gains while the producer loses, and
they roughly offset each other at least. Here, too, the gains to the reuser
should exceed the loss to the producer based on increased competition and
value added to the second program. Of course, the more elements of a
program that are reused, the more equal redistribution of benefits becomes.
Social welfare should increase due to increased competition and
increased value to computer program users. 131 The story is not complete,
there, though. Society should expect some decreased incentives to create by
the original developer. The decrease in social benefits is likely outweighed
by the gained benefits of increased competition and added value in reuse,
127

Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 148-49 (1989)
(holding that the patent system alone governs copying of ideas and functional elements);
Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 853 (1982) (affirming finding that
color of medicine was functional).
128
Christopher Hager, Note, Apples & Oranges: Reverse Engineering as a Fair Use
After Atari v. Nintendo and Sega v. Accolade, 20 RUTGERS COMPUTER AND TECH. L. J.
259, 320 (1994) (“[T]heir true objectives were to cash in on commercial markets
established by the plaintiffs . . . .”).
129
David A. Rice, Sega and Beyond: A Beacon for Fair Use Analysis . . . At Least as
Far as It Goes, 19 DAYTON L. REV. 1131, 1146 (1994) (“The Ninth Circuit concluded,
however, that the public benefit resulting from a commercial use is a factor worthy of
consideration even if the objective and consequences of the use is economic gain”).
130
Lauren Bruzzone, Note, Copyright and License Protection for Computer Programs:
A Market Oriented Assessment, 11 PACE L. REV. 303, 314 (1991). Indeed, Google
attempted to license Java from Sun, but the fee was so high (and time limited) that it was
apparently cheaper to write a compatible version. James Niccolai, Google: Sun Offered to
License Java for $100 million, NETWORK WORLD (July 22, 2011),
http://www.networkworld.com/news/2011/072211-google-sun-offered-to-license.html.
131
Teter, supra note 120, at 1063-71.
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but it is a consideration nonetheless.
Like the customer needs factor, it is also possible that societal costs will
increase greatly due to widespread dissemination of an inferior standard. 132
On the other hand, however, if the court examines which elements are truly
necessary to compete and allows reuse of only those elements, then it is
likely that technology will advance due to new elements added by the
reuser. Because the primary benefit of this factor is market entry, it is
reasonable to expect that new competitors that do not slavishly copy will
add new program elements in order to actually make a profit.
4. Breach of an Economic Relationship
If the reuser breaches an economic relationship with the original
software creator, then courts will be less likely to allow the reuse. This
economic relationship might be a contract or an employment relationship.
Here, the original would see costs associated with the economic breach.
In copyright, these costs could be quite large if source code is involved.
This loss is transferred to the reuser, who sees a benefit that might even
exceed the loss to the producer. If the reuser gained less than the producer
lost, then ordinary contract remedies, if available, might be sufficient to
deter breach. Furthermore, where there is a prior economic relationship—
that is, where the reuser knew about the prior work and breached an
obligation by reusing it—one would expect that the reuser would only do so
if it expected large gains.
Breaching economic relationships reduces social welfare because it
reduces incentive to contract or create where obligations may be breached.
From a software reuse perspective this is the most important consideration
of this factor. Many works are created based on promises, and if reuse is
allow without payment, then fewer works might be created. This would be
bad for society.
This factor is the reason why Whelan v. Jaslow was normatively the
right outcome, despite its critics. However, because of this factor’s limited
application to design patents (except those involving prior economic
relationships), it is included here primarily for completeness.
IV. APPLYING THE ANALYSIS TO DESIGN PATENTS
Though the economic analysis works quite well with copyrighted
132

Christopher A. Cotropia & James Gibson, The Upside of Intellectual Property's
Downside, 57 UCLA L. REV. 921, 923 (2010) (“If so, then the usual story gets reversed:
We should grant protection when - indeed, because - its net effect is to discourage
innovation in a disfavored industry.”).
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software, 133 the design patent is a different animal. Consideration of those
differences is appropriate to determine whether economic principles from
copyright should even apply.
Assuming the analysis does apply, there are two primary ways that
courts can act as gatekeepers to maximize social welfare relating to GUI
design patents. The first is the determination of whether a design is
ornamental or functional. The second is determining which infringement
arguments are allowed by the court—filtration.
Courts should embrace this gatekeeping role for design patents and
consider social welfare. They should do so, even if implicitly; they are
certainly not doing it now.
I make no claim that these analogies hold true for all of design patent
law, though they might. For graphical user interfaces, however, design
protection is very similar to copyright protection with respect to
functionality and infringement. This section addresses each facet in turn.
A. Design Patent and Copyright Differences
1. Functional Differences
Unlike copyrights, design patents are examined by the PTO prior to
issuance, and theoretically claim only novel and non-obvious design
elements. This is a critical difference: it would be better to address concerns
during examination if possible rather than wait until an infringement action.
To be sure, there is an in terrorem effect associated with the mere existence
of design patents, but the economic analysis here assumes that ship has
sailed. Part II discusses the importance of allowing fewer patents, but this
part assumes that the Court takes the dispute as it finds it. Even so, all is not
lost; after all, the volume of copyright GUI cases decreased significantly as
legal principles settled and judicial treatment of interfaces became expected.
There is no reason to believe that the design patents would be any different.
Aside from examination, there are important differences associated in
copyright and patent protection. For example, design patents do not allow
for independent development. Copyright law allows for independently
developed versions of even identical designs.
Further, copyrights typically cover entire computer programs. This
might include the entire user interface, the entire source code, and other
program elements. Design patents only claim discrete elements of the GUI.
However, copyright lawsuits rarely relate to the entire user interface; every
important case involved the arrangement of a few elements, the so-called
133

See, e.g., Risch, supra note 3. Though hardly a provable assertion, I recall telling
colleagues that Napster would never be considered a fair use based on the factors.
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“look and feel.”
Finally, there is little room for a court to modulate the level of
protection that a design patent offers. Unlike copyright, which offers
numerous ways a court might reduce protection, a design patent is either
valid or invalid, and it is either infringed or non-infringed.
2. Conceptual Differences
More conceptually, copyright and patent should be protecting two
different things. Despite pretextual protection of “expression,” copyright
has historically been used to protect functionality. The key cases discussed
above, Lotus v. Borland, Whelan v. Jaslow, and Computer Associates v.
Altai, were all about protection of the operable aspects of the program, not
the static graphical screens. In each case, the structure, sequence, and
organization of the user interface was combined with the remainder of the
program to create a functional whole.
As such, the abstraction, filtration, and comparison efforts were an
attempt to determine which functions (and how they were triggered on the
screen) could be owned by the original maker and which could be reused.
Design patents, on the other hand, are supposed to protect only the
design of the software. Even if there were to be some filtration, the
comparison should be to copyright’s “useful article” doctrine, which limits
copyright protection of useful graphical works only to the non-functional
aspects. The problem is that the test for separating functionality from
expression in copyright is a mess generally, 134 and was basically abandoned
in computer software.
Consider, for example, this short quote from Lotus Dev. Corp. v.
Borland Int'l: 135
Whatever expression there may be in the arrangement of the parts of
a VCR is not capable of existing separately from the VCR itself, so
an ordinary VCR would not be copyrightable. Computer programs,
unlike VCRs, are copyrightable as “literary works.” Accordingly,
one might argue, the “buttons” used to operate a computer program
are not like the buttons used to operate a VCR, for they are not
subject to a useful-article exception. The response, of course, is that
the arrangement of buttons on a VCR would not be copyrightable
even without a useful-article exception, because the buttons are an
uncopyrightable “method of operation.” 136
134

See, McKenna & Sandburg, supra note 47.
49 F.3d 807 (1995).
136
Id. at 817 (citation omitted).
135
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This short segment a) improperly applied the useful article doctrine with
respect to the VCR (the buttons are surely separable from the VCR); b)
incorrectly implied that the doctrine would not apply to software (but GUIs
are graphical works); and c) then abandoned the doctrine for method of
operation analysis.
This does not bode well for a similar “separability” analysis for GUI
design patents.
3. Reconciling the Differences
The question remains, then, whether design patent rules are best
informed by economic analysis that might otherwise apply to copyright.
The answer to that question is yes. There may be differences, but those
differences are at the doctrinal, not welfare maximization level. Even the
conceptual differences discussed above are really about which doctrine to
apply. But there is no law that says the doctrines used to maximize welfare
for design patents must match the doctrines used to maximize welfare for
copyrights. An important feature of the analysis is that courts do not know
that they are using it; instead, they instinctually use whatever tools they
have to maximize welfare. So, if conceptual separability is a failure for
copyright, and design patents allows for some form of filtration, then courts
should choose filter rather than separate.
The economic analogies hold true even if one disbelieves the normative
assumptions of the economic considerations presented here. For example, if
one believes that more protection would better incentivize creation, the
same would be true of both copyright and design patent. If one believed that
less protection would better serve the public interest, the same would still be
true of both. The courts should apply the tools available to reach the best
level; I think my factors are sufficient, but others may supplement or
replace the factors as they see fit.
Even though design patents are different from copyright in many ways,
the economic factors affecting graphical user interface design patent
protection are very similar to the factors affecting copyright protection
when it comes to functionality and infringement. 137 Such patents are about
surface ornamentation, after all. Functionality in design patent law is
analogous to the idea/expression dichotomy in copyright law. Abstraction
and filtration in design patent law could be analogous to abstraction and
filtration in copyright law.
137

Mark A. Lemley & David W. O'Brien, Encouraging Software Reuse, 49 STAN. L.
REV. 255, 296-98 (1997) (discussing how patent protection can lead to market in reusable
software components).
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B. Ornamentality/Functionality
As discussed above, design patents are intended for ornamental product
designs that are not functional. If a design is solely functional, then it must
be protected, if at all, by a utility patent. However, courts rarely make
distinctions about different types of functionality, and they have long held
that where functionality and ornamentality mix, a design patent may issue
so long as the design is not dictated by functionality. 138 The number of
cases invalidating patents is far outweighed by the number of cases
allowing them. 139
The law currently includes few limitations on patenting. Federal Circuit
precedent allows design patents that incorporate functional elements, unless
the design embodies the function or unless the function is necessary to
compete in the market. 140 But design patents do not have a “market,”
making the test difficult. Designs that might be functional in one context,
say a key blade designed to fit a type of lock, 141 becomes completely
ornamental when hung as a necklace pendant or used as a (dangerous)
toy. 142 Determinations of functionality in a market must depend, at least in
part, on how the product will be used. 143 Patentees can almost always point
138

In re Koehring, 37 F.2d 421, 424 (C.C.P.A. 1930) (holding that utilitarian objects
may be protected with design patents, so long as someone cares about their ornamentation);
Robert W. Brown & Co. v. De Bell, 243 F.2d 200, 202-203 (9th Cir. 1957) (“While it is the
design which is patented, it is immaterial that the subject of the design may embody a
functional or utilitarian purpose.”); In re Carletti, 328 F.2d 1020, 1022 (C.C.P.A. 1964);
L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 1123 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Hupp v.
Siroflex of Am., Inc., 122 F.3d 1456, 1460-61 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (design of concrete stamp
ornamental, even though its sole function is to stamp concrete of the same shape).
139
See also Du Mont & Janis, Virtual Designs, supra note 41, at *46 (finding one
rejection for functionality among all GUI patents since 1996).
140
Best Lock Corp. v. Ilco Unican Corp., 94 F.3d 1563, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (design
of key blade functional because no other shape would work in lock); Avia Group Int’l, Inc.
v. L.A. Gear Cal., 853 F.2d 1557, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1988); L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn
Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 1123 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“If the particular design is essential to the
use of the article, it can not be the subject of a design patent.”).
141
Best Lock, 94 F.3d at 1566.
142
See, e.g., Du Mont & Janis, Virtual Designs, supra note 41, at *60 (t-shirt can
infringe GUI patent since patent covers only the image and is not limited to a display
screen). Consider Irwin Mainway’s Bag o’ Glass and Chainsaw Teddy Bear, both of which
have dual function/playtime uses. Consumer Probe, SATURDAY NIGHT LIVE (Dec. 11,
1976),
http://snltranscripts.jt.org/76/76jconsumerprobe.phtml
and
http://www.hulu.com/watch/115713.
143
37 CFR § 1.153 requires that the title and claim each identify the article of
manufacture. However, broad leeway is given to describe use of the article, so long as it is
clear what the article is. MPEP § 1503.1 ¶ 15.05 (“An acceptable title would be ‘door for
cabinets, houses, or the like,’ while the title ‘door or the like’ would be unacceptable. . . .”).
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to some ornamental aspect that is unrelated to a particular use.
Thus, the functionality rule may not strike the right balance that allows
patenting on ornamentality but not functionality. After all, a court must first
find that the design incorporates a functional element at all, and courts may
disagree on what GUI elements are functional rather than ornamental. 144
Additionally, if design alternatives exist, courts will not find
functionality, 145 presumably even if all the alternatives are patented. This is
a distinct departure from copyright, where few design alternatives will bar
protection. Further, the defendant must prove functionality by clear and
convincing evidence. 146
As a result, a combination of elements, each of which might serve some
utilitarian purpose, can be protected as a group if the design in the entirety
is primarily ornamental rather than functional. 147
But courts need not allow such patents. Intermediate analysis might
strike a different balance. A design that is ornamental when conceived may
become functional years later, as technology expands and changes. Indeed,
some designs may be functional when originally conceived, and become
ornamental as time passes; for example, images of floppy disks used to
denote saving data are less functional today than they were in 1995.
Two examples illustrate how an ex post approach to functionality might
be illuminated by the economic factors. 148 The first is D457,164, 149 which
Thus, “Key Design for locks, necklaces, or toys” would be acceptable.
144
Du Mont & Janis, Virtual Designs, supra note 41, at *34 (expressing surprise at the
number of utility patents cited as prior art in design patents).
145
Hupp, 122 F.3d at 1460-61; Avia, 853 F.2d at 1563; Thom McAn, 988 F.2d at
1123. See, e.g., Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Motion for Judgment as a
Matter of Law, Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elec. Co. Ltd., Case No. Case No.: 11-CV-01846LHK, at p. 4 (Document 2220, Jan. 29, 2013) (ruling that jury need not have been
instructed about functional elements, because alternate designs were available).
146
L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 1123 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
Presumably, the examiner could reject functional designs using a lower evidentiary
standard, but this virtually never happens.
147
988 F.2d at 1123. See also, Lee v. Dayton–Hudson Corp., 838 F.2d 1186, 1189
(Fed.Cir.1988). But see, Barofsky v. Gen. Elec. Corp., 396 F.2d 340, 344 (9th Cir. 1968)
(“[B]ecause the dominant features of the design [for a cabinet door], and therefore the
design as a whole, are primarily functional, this is not a valid design patent.”).
148
Most of the examples presented relate to Apple, Inc., design patents. This is not
accidental; Apple has protected its user interfaces with design patents in a highly visible
way though, notably, in 2012 it was granted half as many design patents as Microsoft and
fewer than even RIM (Blackberry). James Juo, Design Patent Prosecution, DESIGN
PATENTS IN THE MODERN WORLD, at 3 (Conference Proceedings, Apr. 5, 2013)
http://www.law.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/event/322028/media/slspublic/final_new_pp
tx_658586_1-full_size-op-1.pdf. See also Du Mont & Janis, Virtual Designs, supra note
41, at *26 (noting that Microsoft is responsible for most of the growth of GUI design
patents).
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shows an expanding application window. One image is reproduced below,
but the patent claims the entire expansion 150 of the window from nothing to
a rectangular window.
At the time this patent was filed, 2000, the idea of animated window
expansion was known, but the particular animation associated with Apple’s
design may have been more ornamental than functional. There is no
functional requirement that window maximization be animated (though it
might improve user experience), 151 and there was certainly no functional
requirement that windows be expanded in this particular way.
However, as time passes, customers might come to expect this behavior.
First, docking of minimized applications at the bottom of the screen is well
accepted across operating systems. Second, animated window expansion is
commonly used. Third, there are only so many ways for a window to
expand from a docked icon to a rectangle. Thus, what was once a nice
design might now be a de facto standard.
As such, a court’s willingness to protect the design might decrease as
the standard becomes entrenched in user expectations. At least one case
supports this view of functionality. 152 Drawing on trademark law, the court
ruled that design elements are functional if they are essential to the purpose
of the article or affect its cost or quality. 153 Using this standard, customer
expectations, even of color, might be considered functional. 154
This implicates three of the factors. First, the substitution is not direct.
The animation is not the entire program, but only a piece of it. It is unlikely
that software companies will stop developing graphical user interfaces, nor
even new expansion animations, if some reuse were allowed. This factor
may not favor reuse, but it does not necessarily weigh against reuse.
Second, if this were a de facto standard, then the customer need for
compatibility would favor reuse. Third, if there are only a few ways to
expand a window, then the competitive need for compatibility might favor
reuse.

149

Filed Jan. 5, 2000.
Or minimization, if you are a glass half-empty kind of person. It is important to
note that the design is not functional and could apply to either event, so long as they look
the same.
151
WILBERT O. GALITZ, THE ESSENTIAL GUIDE TO USER INTERFACE DESIGN: AN
INTRODUCTION TO GUI DESIGN PRINCIPLES AND TECHNIQUES 682 (3d ed. 2007) (“The
changing of states of an element with two or more states will be easier to understand if the
transitions are animated instead of being instantaneous.”).
152
Amini Innovation Corp. v. Anthony Cal., Inc., 439 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
153
Id. at 1371.
154
Cf. Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 853 (1982) (affirming
finding that color of medicine is functional).
150
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Another example is Patent No. D670,713, 155 claiming page turning
animation. Here, the patent is newer, so the functionality implication is less
reliant the passage of time. In this case, the functionality concern is twofold. First, the animation looks a lot like a book page turning. That is the
point of the design, of course: simulating a book page turn on a display
screen looks nice.

However, if the design simulates reality then it is, in a sense, dictated by
functional concerns – the way a book might look. Closely related to this is
that there may be limited ways to simulate a book page turn, so that
155

Filed Dec. 19, 2011.
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competitive needs for functionality might reign. The factors apply in much
the same way in this case.
Even if the entire design is not dictated by functionality under current
law’s requirements to bar a design patent, there are two ways that courts
might consider functionality in designs like the page turning book. The first
is obviousness. If the design looks like something in the real world, then
perhaps the design is obvious. 156 Despite the good sense of this approach, 157
current law disfavors this type of obviousness consideration by the court as
a gatekeeper. First, many district courts have divested themselves of any
gatekeeping factual analysis in obviousness cases, leaving everything to the
jury. 158 Second, as discussed above, obviousness rules in design patents are
extremely permissive, so courts and the PTO do not reject patents.
However, more rigorous nonobviousness requirements applied to design
patents might invalidate functional designs.
A second way to handle functionality would be to allow such patents,
but to filter out functional elements or otherwise limit infringement
findings. This is consistent with Federal Circuit precedent:
If the patented design is primarily functional rather than ornamental,
the patent is invalid. [] However, when the design also contains
ornamental aspects, it is entitled to a design patent whose scope is
limited to those aspects alone and does not extend to any functional
elements of the claimed article. 159
For the page turn design, this would mean that a competing design
would not infringe merely for implementing a page turning animation.
Furthermore, only designs essentially identical to the patented design would
infringe. This solution is only palatable if there are many ways to design
156

Du Mont & Janis, Virtual Designs, supra note 41, at *54 (discussing anticipation of
computerized daisy by a daisy drawn on flowerpot).
157
See, e.g., Dann v. Johnson 425 U.S. 219, 227-28 (1976) (holding that known
process implemented on a computer is obvious); In re Glavas. 230 F.2d 447, 450 (CCPA
1956) (allowing use of surface ornamentation from any type of product to be considered for
design patent obviousness).
158
See, e.g., Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Motion for Judgment as a
Matter of Law, Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elec. Co. Ltd., Case No. Case No.: 11-CV-01846LHK, at p. 5 (Document 2220, Jan. 29, 2013). The court allowed the jury to determine all
facts associated with obviousness, but the jury received no special verdict questions about
any of the factual questions from which the court could make a legal conclusion, such as
the scope of the prior art, differences between the patent and the prior art, the level of skill
in the art, or any secondary factors. Instead, the jury’s “patent is valid” verdict was
assumed to implicitly include all facts necessary to find the patent non-obvious. The court
then assumed that all the facts favored obviousness and ruled accordingly.
159
Richardson v. Stanley Works, Inc., 597 F. 3d 1288, 1293-94 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
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page turning animations. The next section considers infringement and
filtration of functionality in more detail.
C. Infringement
User interfaces are rarely identical. The test courts use to determine
whether they are close enough to infringe is whether an ordinary observer
who is familiar with the design and what came before it would think that the
accused design is substantially the same. 160 This test has always allowed
some equivalents, 161 but proving infringement is not always easy because
the prior art must be considered. 162 Indeed, infringement findings appear to
be rarer than some might think. 163
Thus, where the accused GUI is not identical to the patented design, the
court must determine the zone of potential infringement. This is a natural
gatekeeper function that allows application of the factors. The allowable
patent scope for purposes of equivalents might be varied by courts
depending on the market substitution, the customer need for compatibility,
and competitive need for compatibility.
Consider, for example, Design Patent No. D604,305, 164 owned by
Apple, Inc., which is pictured in the introduction. The patent claims a
screen for an electronic device with icons presented on it. The icons are
square with rounded corners, and they are layered four across. The patent
includes a “fixed” row of four icons at the bottom of the screen. In the
actual device, we know that these icons—presumably those most favored by
the user—remain the same, no matter what screen one looks at. Of course,
the patent does not require that the icons stay the same from screen to
screen. It only requires the icons to be on a gray background at the bottom.
Samsung developed a competing interface for its smartphones. Apple
sued Samsung, and a jury found that Samsung’s “Touch Wiz” interface
160

Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511, 528 (1871); Egyptian Goddess, Inc.
v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 670 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc).
161
Geo. Borgfeldt & Co. v. Weiss, 265 F. 268, 270-71 (2d Cir. 1920) (holding that
design patent claiming doll with cap might be infringed by doll with different head dress,
including painted hair). Indeed, people often use the dinnerware at issue in Gorham as the
prime example; there were many differences between the patent and the accused products.
Perry Saidman, U.S. Design Patent Infringement, DESIGN PATENTS IN THE MODERN
WORLD,
at
6
(Conference
Proceedings,
Apr.
5,
2013),
http://www.law.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/event/322028/media/slspublic/ENTIRE%20
Post%20EG%20040313-1.pdf.
162
See, e.g., images of the patent, accused product, and prior art at issue in Egyptian
Goddess, in which no infringement was found, despite apparent equivalence. Juo, supra
note 148, at 8.
163
Saidmain, supra note 161, at 24.
164
Filed June 23, 2007.
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infringed this design patent. 165
At the time of patent application filing, 2007, Apple’s design might
have been ornamental and not dictated by functionality. After all, the look
of the screen does not do anything when viewed. Furthermore, icons need
not be rounded, and the icons at the bottom need not have a different color.
At a time when few other devices had a touch-screen that would
accommodate finger taps and gestures, the combination of elements on this
screen may have been an “ornamental design for an article of
manufacture.” 166
This was especially true because the first operable screen the user saw
on the Apple iPhone looked much like the drawing in the design patent. 167
Thus, ex ante, the patent may be ornamental/nonfunctional.
This view is charitable, in many respects. Pieces of the design must
surely have been driven by functional considerations. The dock is especially
troubling, because functionality might dictate a different color for a set of
icons that does not change from screen to screen. Because the design patent
does not claim any functional features, it presents as if the color is merely
ornamental because the context of a working graphical user interface is
missing. But any user of the iPhone, indeed any user of computer software,
knows better.
The idea of a fixed area using different coloring that held frequently
used programs was not terribly new. Microsoft had used something similar
since Windows95, and many “quick launch” program docks were available,
and those docks were all a different color. RIM had introduced icons in
rows on its Blackberry devices years before the iPhone was released, 168 and
Nokia had even provided an interface with square icons aligned in rows. 169
Of course, one had to scroll through the icons rather than touch them, but
the arrangement only made scrolling easier. And scrolling should be
irrelevant, because this is a design patent—only the appearance matters.
Further, Adobe had used square icons with rounded corners for so long

165

Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elec. Co., Jury Form, Case No.: 11-CV-01846-LHK (Aug.
24, 2012), http://www.groklaw.net/pdf3/ApplevSamsung-1930.pdf.
166
35 U.S.C. § 171.
167
There are other difficulties with calling this interface layout the “design” of an
article. After all, the user controls both the number of icons on the screen and the images
on those icons (by changing the applications on the screen).
168
RIM
BlackBerry
7230,
PCMAG.COM
(Oct.
1,
2003),
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,1265089,00.asp; Du Mont & Janis, Virtual
Designs, supra note 41, at *21 (noting that RIM’s design patent for rows of icons is one of
the most cited design patents).
169
Nokia 6681 review: Extra style, GSM ARENA (May 8, 2005),
http://www.gsmarena.com/nokia_6681-review-38p3.php.
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that it abandoned them before Apple even applied for its patent. 170 The
federal government had even recommended square icons with rounded
corners for icons in vehicle displays. 171
Even discounting the prior art and purely functional elements, many
(many!) consumers grew to know and recognize how to use the Apple’s
iPhone user interface as a whole, even if they did not own a device
themselves. A few short years after introduction, such touch screens were
ubiquitous. As smartphone sales grew, companies released competing
operating systems.
While square icons with rounded corners and a “dock” of four icons was
not required, it was one of only a few functional ways to organize the
limited space on a screen. 172 It also allowed consumers to switch from the
iPhone to Samsung’s Touch Wiz with minimal costs associated with
learning of new layout concepts.
Thus, courts should be more inclined to find Apple’s design functional
now even if it was not entirely functional then. While Apple saw competing
products as nothing more than pilfering of its design to steal customers, 173
the benefits of new entry of competing operating systems encouraged
through low switching costs can maximize social benefit. Such designs
would not always be functional ex ante, but the later reuse of a de facto
standard presents new facts unavailable when the first design is created.
To address the inevitable counter-argument, it is unlikely that earlier
creators like Apple would cease to have an incentive to create new designs.
To begin, Apple reused elements from the past. Further, Apple did not
know which of its user interface elements would become so important that
their protection might be limited. Even now, Apple continues to create new
designs that will not become standards. It is also possible that the fame of
170

Prescott Perez-Fox, Out with the Old, PRESCOTT’S DESIGN BLOG (Dec. 17, 2006),
http://www.perezfox.com/2006/12/17/out-with-the-old/.
171
IN-VEHICLE DISPLAY ICONS AND OTHER INFORMATION ELEMENTS: VOLUME I,
Publication
No.
FHWA-RD-03-065,
at
4-4
Fig.
4-2
(Sept.
2004),
http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/publications/research/safety/03065/03065.pdf.
172
Indeed, on larger devices like the iPad, the number of docked icons grows. This
implies that the number of icons is determined almost exclusively by size, rather than
aesthetics. Of course, choosing the right size and spacing may be an important aesthetic
design decision; the question is whether one can exclude others from reusing those
decisions on devices of nearly identical size and shape.
173
Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elec. Co., Volume 2 (Trial Transcript), Case No.: 11-CV01846-LHK (July 31, 2012) (“It meant that apple had invented something that was so
unique and innovative that customers would no longer accept the devices that looked and
acted -- that didn't have touch screens, for example. Faced with this reality . . . Samsung
had two choices: . . . it could come up with its own designs [and] beat Apple fairly in the
marketplace; or it could copy Apple.”), http://www.groklaw.net/pdf4/ApplevSamsung1547.pdf.
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its design has caused it to stop creating improved interface elements despite
the need for them. 174 This is why new market entrants are so important.
However, when considering Apple’s GUI design, it is difficult to argue
that the entire design is functional. Only some of the basic ideas and other
aspects are functional. For example, courts should not let a competitor reuse
the exact icons, in the exact order, of those in the design. This differentiates
the iPhone design from the unfolding window or the page turn animation.
With the latter animations, the entire design might be considered functional,
whereas with the whole GUI the entire design might be protectable, and
reuse might be adjusted through infringement considerations. In this sense,
the design protection is similar to “thin” copyright protection. It might be
protected against direct copying, but not against reuse of the ideas that
cause high-level similarities.
And copying of high-level similarities is precisely what Apple argued at
trial, and won. The Touch Wiz interface shown in the introduction is not an
exact copy of the Apple design. In many ways, it is not even close. The
icons are different. They are different colors. They are in a different order,
and there are more of them. The background is a different color. The icons
that were similar were driven by functional requirements, like the color
green, the shape of a handset (which was not new to Apple), and a clock.
Though it is technically irrelevant, the functions of the icons on the dock
were different. Given these differences, Apple argued that the idea of the
design was the same. One of the case exhibits is reproduced below; it makes
Apple’s strategy clear.

174

Justin Fox, What Kind of Innovative Does Apple Have to Be?, HARVARD BUSINESS
REVIEW BLOG NETWORK (June 11, 2013), http://blogs.hbr.org/fox/2013/06/what-kind-ofinnovative-does-apple-have-to-be.html. Consider, for example, the lack of widgets on
Apple devices.
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The strategy is plain. Samsung infringed because it used a) a grid, b)
rounded rectangles, mixes of icon styles, colorful icons, and a bottom row
with offsetting background. These are functions—ideas, ergonomics,
operations. They are not the design themselves. To be sure, there is some
similarity in the structure, sequence, and organization, but it is the structure
and selection of different design elements.
In other words, the only way for Samsung could infringe is that the
doctrine of equivalents applied so broadly that merely using the same ideas
infringed. This seems to violate the maxim—in use today even as applied to
design patents—of “that which would infringe if after, anticipates if
before.” 175 Given the rigidity with which the obviousness test is applied, as
discussed above, it is unclear whether any court would say that Samsung’s
interface would render Apple’s patent non-novel if it predated it; 176 Apple
would surely claim that the functionality is similar, but the actual design
175

Int'l Seaway Trading Corp. v. Walgreens Corp., 589 F.3d 1233, 1239 (Fed. Cir.
2009) (“Moreover, it has been well established for over a century that the same test must be
used for both infringement and anticipation.”). Compare Id. at 1239 (finding that Crocs
patent does not anticipate plaintiff’s patent despite relatively small differences) with Crocs,
Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 598 F.3d 1294, 1304-05 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (finding infringement
of Crocs patent despite relatively small differences from accused clogs). See also Du Mont
& Janis, Virtual Designs, supra note 41, at *54 (discussing anticipation of computerized
daisy by a daisy drawn on flowerpot because daisy on wallpaper, carpet, and shoes would
infringe flowerpot patent).
176
35 U.S.C. § 102.
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differs from the Samsung in important ways, such as all of the icons having
different images. And if the Apple patent would be allowed even if
Samsung’s design were prior art, then Samsung should not be considered
infringing.
But the court allowed the infringement verdict to stand. Here,
application of the principles discussed here would have allowed the court to
reach a different result. While Apple, and perhaps the conventional wisdom,
believe that Android “copied” the iPhone patent, this was not slavish
copying. The market substitution was not 1:1, and Android added value.
Furthermore, the aspects that were copied were the functional aspects. As
noted above, this implicates the customer need factor, and even the
competitive need factor.
At the time that Samsung decided whether to implement Touch Wiz in
the way it did, social welfare would have increased most by allowing this
particular reuse. As a reminder, maximized wealth is societal wealth, not
Apple’s wealth. The world is better off with two smartphones competing for
customers by introducing more and better features, especially if users can
easily switch between the two of them as they so desire. As one example,
Apple’s unwillingness to implement a larger screen until 2012 despite
tremendous popularity of larger Samsung screens implies that if Apple were
the only product on the market, users would have missed out on product
features that had nothing to do with the GUI design.
Current law may not (and in fact, did not) allow the wealth maximizing
outcome. There are, for example, other ways to design a user interface for
small mobile devices, such as Microsoft’s Windows 8. Under current law,
this implies that Apple’s design cannot be functional because it was not
dictated by function. However, alternative interfaces have not done nearly
as well in the market. 177
Another reason current law may not allow the wealth maximizing
outcome is that courts are frenetic about whether and how to factor (the
design patent term for filter) out functionality. The leading Federal Circuit
decision, Egyptian Goddess, 178 ruled that the infringement analysis must
consider the design as a whole, and not merely focus on the novel
aspects. 179 But the case also noted that courts could instruct juries about
177

Alan Shimel, Windows Phone U.S. Market Share Growth Outpaces Android,
NETWORK WORLD (Jun. 4, 2013) (despite growth, Windows 8 phones less than 6% of
smartphone market), http://www.networkworld.com/community/blog/windows-phone-usmarket-share-growth-outpaces-android. Apple would say that the reason is that its design is
desired by more people, given that most of its business is going to either Apple or Android
platforms that use a similar interface.
178
Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc).
179
543 F.3d at 672-73.
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prior art and functional considerations. 180 However, the court left matters up
to the discretion of the jury. 181
This left later courts with little guidance. Some judges have factored out
functionality, especially in bench trials. 182 Other judges have refused to do
so. For example, in Apple v. Samsung, Judge Koh ruled that filtering might
be permissive in some cases, but was not appropriate for a jury. 183
In addition to the clear guidance in Egyptian Goddess and Richardson
that filtering of functionality will be helpful to the fact finder (not just judge
fact finders), as a matter of policy it seems odd that only in a bench trial can
the proper analysis of functionality take place. Indeed, leaving filtering to
the jury requires the appellate court to guess whether any filtering took
place to determine whether there was substantial evidence of infringement.
Worse, appellate courts cannot guess; they must assume that filtering took
place, and assume that the jury properly compared only the ornamental
features, even if the jury did not do so.
Thus, without such filtering, patentees can seek ever widening
infringement claims based on reuse of the ideas and functions in the patent,
rather than reuse of the actual design. The great irony of Egyptian Goddess
is that it disapproves of written claim constructions layered on the drawings
themselves; the court makes clear that the drawings should speak for
themselves if they can. 184 This rule—when rigidly applied—leads to the
very thing the case disapproves: infringement rulings based not on the
drawings, but based on the ideas and functions in the drawings.
In contrast, the economic analysis implies that the law must explicitly
allow filtering if social welfare is a goal. The court must be a gatekeeper
180

Egyptian Goddess 543 F.3d at 680 (“[A] trial court can usefully guide the finder of
fact by addressing a number of other issues that bear on the scope of the claim. Those
include . . . distinguishing between those features of the claimed design that are ornamental
and those that are purely functional. . . Providing an appropriate measure of guidance to a
jury without crossing the line and unduly invading the jury’s fact-finding process is a task
that trial courts are very much accustomed to . . . .”)(citations omitted).
181
Id.
182
See, e.g. Lee, 838 F.2d at 1188 (affirming district court focus on specific design
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that filters out functionality in the infringement calculus. Furthermore, it
may have been error for the Federal Circuit to have left such instructions to
the discretion of district court judges. Functional filtering is a matter of
claim construction—determining what the patentee owns and what it does
not. 185 As such, the construction should be performed by courts as a matter
of law, pursuant to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Markman. 186 As with
obviousness, there should be no exceptionalism for design patent claim
scope determinations.
Assuming that courts will perform filtering, Lee v. Dayton-Hudson 187
provides a clear, simple example. In that case, the design covered a
particular design for a massager with a particular handle and rolling balls on
the end. 188 The accused device comprised a differently shaped handle with
differently shaped rolling balls on the end. 189 The Federal Circuit affirmed a
finding of non-infringement, ruling that the designs themselves must match,
not the ideas embodied by them: “While we agree [] that infringement can
be found for designs that are not identical to the patented design, such
designs must be equivalent in their ornamental, not functional, aspects.” 190
It should be noted, though, that filtering is not a panacea. Even if a court
properly filters out functional elements, comparing the “entire” remaining
ornamental design while ignoring functionality remains difficult to achieve
in practice. 191 It may be even more difficult to achieve with graphical user
interfaces, where form and function are intertwined.
Even so, the Lee case demonstrates that, as with copyright, courts have
the ability—and some of the legal tools if they are willing to use them—to
attempt to maximize social welfare. This is achievable right now, because
185
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general configuration made necessary by function must give to a patented design such
breadth as to include everything of similar configuration, would be to subvert the purpose
of the law, which is to promote the decorative arts. . . .”).
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2006) (“The trial court is correct to factor out the functional aspects of various design
elements, but that discounting of functional elements must not convert the overall
infringement test to an element-by-element comparison. Thus, the trial court erred in its
application of the “overall similarity” test on summary judgment.”).
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the Federal Circuit allowed it in Egyptian Goddess and the Supreme Court
has arguably mandated it; district courts should take up the mantle.
CONCLUSION
Whether knowingly or not, courts have considered the importance of
graphical user interface elements and done their best to reach outcomes that
incentivize future innovation while maximizing current benefits. This
means that software designers cannot own everything, even if they patent a
design. It also means that we might be willing to live with slightly less
incentive to create the first program, if it spurs improvement in the second
program. To understand this point, one need only compare the most popular
software packages today to the most popular packages doing the same thing
5, 10, or 20 years ago.
Copyright law has long understood this, and economic analysis explains
how courts behaved in practice. Design patent law seems to have missed the
memo, despite the fact that the tools are potentially available to achieve the
same goal. None of the legal tools discussed in the article are newly created.
Instead, the tools have been left to languish, perhaps because—until now—
few design patents have been asserted to protect a large portion of an
interface, rather than a single icon.
Given that tools are available, courts should use them and act as
gatekeepers in design patent cases. Like in copyright, they need not
affirmatively attempt to maximize—or even consider—social welfare.
Instead, their instincts, coupled with the available doctrine, should suffice.
If courts are allowed to aggressively consider functionality, and if they are
encouraged to filter out functional elements during infringement, then they
will likely gravitate, as they did in copyright cases, to beneficial outcomes.

